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'The Development of the Software Manual Printing Sector in Ireland'
The printing of software manuals has become a very important and distinct 
subsector within the overall printing industry. This thesis sets out to examine 
the development of this subsector by examining the market structure of the 
sector, identifying the competitive forces that exist and outlining the strategies 
adopted by the firms in the market.
The starting point for the thesis is an examination of the traditional structure- 
conduct-performance model and its relationship with the wider business policy 
field.- This examination is elementary and serves to provide a very useful 
starting point. Next a specific framework is developed to examine the 
software manual printing sector. This framework concentrates on the 
dimensions of structure and conduct, with the causality flowing from 
structural criteria; conduct is equated with a firm's business strategy. The 
dimension of performance is reduced in importance, reflecting the view that 
performance is largely a matter for the individual firms; however performance 
does influence both conduct and structure.
Before examining the software manual sector an outline is provided of the 
printing and publishing industry (NACE 473/474). This outline highlights 
the broader industrial context within which the software manual printing 
industry has emerged.
The software manual printing sector is examined by means of the industrial 
organisation framework developed. This comprises two elements; an analysis 
of the market structure, along the dimensions of market definition, market 
concentration and entry barriers, and a review of the generic strategies adopted 
by the suppliers.
The thesis concludes with a number of industrial policy recommendations for 
this sector, and in particular it outlines that industrial policy is required for both 
traded and non-traded sectors.
"The intensity o f  competition in an industry is neither a  matter o f  coincidence 
nor bad  luck. Rather, competition in an industry is rooted  in its underlying 
econom ic structure and goes w ell beyond the behaviour o f  current competitors"
Competitive Strategy. Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors.
M ichael Porter (1 9 8 0 , P. 3 )
CHAPTER 1
The Structure - Conduct - Performance Paradigm
1.1 The Traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm
The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm has traditionally 
been used as the basis for analysing the structure of an industry. This 
paradigm postulates that the performance in a market is determined by 
the conduct of the firms in that market, which in turn is determined by 
the structural characteristics of that market; thus performance can be 
determined by looking directly at that industry's structure and bypassing 
the firm's conduct or strategy (Figure 1.1). One of the main attractions of 
the SCP model is that it postulates the existence of certain causal 
relationships between the three elements of structure, conduct and 
performance and that such relationships will generally hold true in all 
markets.
The Traditional Structure-Conduct Performance Model
Structure —► Conduct —► Performance
Figure 1.1
As a model for analysing industries the traditional SCP approach is 
subjected to much criticism, which relates to two areas ;
1.1.1 The neoclassical basis of the SCP
1.1.2 The role of causal relationships
1.1.1 The neoclassical basis of the SCP
The SCP paradigm has as its basis the models of perfect and monopoly
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competition, in which firms' objectives are to maximise profits subject to 
cost and revenue constraints. All forms of competition are thought to exist 
between the two polar points of monopoly (with only one firm) and perfect 
competition (with many small firms). As one moves along the spectrum, 
from perfect competition towards a monopoly situation, it is postulated 
that profitability will rise from the normal level towards the supernormal 
level at the monopoly stage (Sawyer, 1981, p. 9). At the monopoly end of 
the spectrum there is only one firm protected by very high entry barriers; 
these barriers insulate the firm from potential competition thereby 
allowing it to earn supernormal profits. At the other end of the spectrum 
the arena of perfect competition is characterised by a multiplicity of firms, 
similar in size, with no collusion, firms acting independently in 
determining both price and output, no firm able for any reason to 
influence price or output more than another, all firms using their existing 
resources equally as efficiently and an absence of any barriers restricting 
entry into the marketplace. In such a situation competition is deemed to 
be perfect, prices will tend towards marginal costs and normal profits will 
be earned.
These assumptions, of competition and profitability, fail to take into 
account the scenario where there are many firms unequal in size and 
resources (and in the effective use of these resources), where there are 
barriers to entry, where a degree of collusion between the firms is found 
and where competitors will react to counteract a move by any one firm.
In particular, it makes no allowances for firms that become more cost 
efficient than their competitors. Demsetz (1973, p. 1-9) came to the 
conclusion that high profits may not be a sign of market power but of 
efficiency and accordingly low cost producers will tend to increase in size 
thus affecting the concentration levels (the pressure will be on all firms to 
be efficient and there will be a tendency for market concentration to 
increase). Demsetz thus argues that the market will develop into that 
which enables production and distribution to be undertaken at least cost.
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The models of perfect competition and monopoly are static models where 
the consumers and producers are both perfectly informed (of both current 
and future states of the world) and their tastes are constant and as a 
result economic equilibrium is reached. Stigler (1963, p. 64) noted of this 
"if the entrepreneurs in a competitive industry correctly anticipated all 
relevant future events and if  they were able to adjust their plans, no 
disequilibrium could arise; the market would be in full equilibrium at 
every moment of time". Many economists (particularly the Austrian 
theorists) argue that knowledge is partial and not perfect and that 
consumers are aware of their tastes but cannot possibly be aware of all 
taste combinations. Similarly while producers know the costs of their 
current production methods they do not know and cannot possibly know 
the costs associated with all possible alternative techniques. Likewise 
they (the producers) may only have a hazy impression of the true demand 
for their product.
As a static model the traditional SCP is only concerned with the position 
of equilibrium and not with how such a position was attained. Of this the 
Austrian economists assert that while the market may move in the 
direction of equilibrium this state will never be attained; instead the 
market will be in a continuous state of flux and as a result the Austrian 
theorists view any analysis of equilibrium as misplaced effort (Ferguson, 
1988, p. 19). The understanding of how the state of equilibrium is 
reached is of fundamental importance in the understanding of an 
industry and Littlechilds (1986, p. 12) notes "Austrian economics sees the 
economic problem as including the discovery of consumer preferences, 
techniques and resource availability and sees the economy as involved in 
a continual process of discovery, co-ordination and change". Similarly 
Marshall's insight into this was very clear as early as 1920; "it is 
especially needful to remember that economic problems are imperfectly 
presented when they are treated as problems of statical equilibrium, and 
not of organic growth" (1920, p. 382). Phillips (1970) supported this view 
when he noted "that without consideration of the more complete and
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endogenous relations among these variables, predictions covering any 
significant time period are quite likely to be wrong". Thus the structure - 
conduct-performance relationships can only provide a snapshot picture of 
the forces at work at a particular time, a more complete and fuller picture 
requires an examination of the evolution of industrial structure through 
time and of how conduct and performance influence structures, conduct 
and performance (Sawyer 1981, p 155).
The neglect of rivalry and competition between firms in the SCP arises 
from two sources (Sawyer, 1981, p. 158). Firstly, the approach is based on 
the premise that the models of perfect competition and monopoly are the 
extremes and that all industries can be placed along specific points of this 
continuum. Since rivalry is not involved in either extreme case, rivalry 
cannot be involved in the intermediate cases. Secondly, the approach is 
essentially concerned with a position of equilibrium, not with how it was 
derived. Rivalry on the other hand is of little importance in such 
positions since the point of equilibrium is a position of 'rest' after each 
firm has striven to achieve their best outcome. Rivalry exists in 
situations of disequilibrium and when the rivalry has been 'resolved' 
equilibrium is reached. However as a contrary view to this it could also be 
argued that what the SCP ignored was not the existence of rivalry but its 
importance in all industries’ structures.
The SCP model views industry structure as being exogenously 
determined, it is determined by factors outside the influence of any one of 
the participating firms and/or it is a result of a series of historic accidents. 
Thus the firms in the market have no latitude to alter the industry 
structure through their strategy or conduct, hence the role of conduct is 
greatly minimised. In practical terms this means that the individual 
firms cannot alter, by means of their strategy (conduct), the barriers to 
entry into their market nor can they affect the industrial concentration 
levels by way of acquisition or merger. However, firms can affect or even. 
deter entry into their industry by carefully choosing their strategies
(Spence, 1979, p 1-9; Salop, 1979, p 335-338).
The final neoclassical criticism relates to the conduct assumption running 
through the paradigm, that of profit maximisation. Where the decision 
makers have a degree of discretion over their companies' objectives this 
discretion can be used in many different ways including a departure from 
the goal of profit maximisation. Departures from this goal will lead to a 
different range of outcomes and such discretion is of vital importance to 
an organisation as it shapes the organisation and establishes goals, 
policies and procedures.
1.1.2 The Role of Causal Relationships
One of the attractions of the SCP model is the positing of causal 
relationships between the market structure and conduct in order to 
determine performance. Such relationships are the basis for giving the 
model practical application. Examples of such relationships would be that 
the greater the number of firms in an industry the more competitive it 
would be hence normal profit would be earned.
However, the causal relationships resulting from the model do not always 
proceed in the one direction nor are they simple relationships outlining 
clearly cause and effect. For example, a low level of profitability may 
induce certain changes in conduct such as a change in price tactics, in 
product policy or promotional expenditures. These changes may then 
affect market structure through decreasing product substitutability or 
changing the entry conditions. However falling profitability may also 
stimulate merger activity which too affects market structure. Thus, the 
complexity of multidirectional chain of events makes it very difficult to 
distinguish between cause and effect and this is further compounded 
when one change alters the markets which then sets in motion other 
changes (Howe, 1978, p. 85). Sawyer (1981) suggests that the single 
equation approach to structure-performance relationships is liable to be
misleading; the solution to this problem is the estimation of a set of 
simultaneous equations. Nelson (1974, p. 212) argues that contrary 
relationships may also hold true. For instance, poor profit performance 
may affect market structure forcing the exit of some firms and, conversely 
high profits may also alter structure by attracting the entry of new firms 
into an industry.
1.2 The Link Between Industrial Economics and Business Policy1
Up to very recently industrial economics has had very little effect on the 
business policy concept of strategy, and business policy has had little 
effect on industrial economics, despite the increasing clear evidence that 
much promise for cross fertilisation existed. The reasons why such cross 
fertilisation has had limited impact, and in particular why industrial 
economics has not had a greater influence on the business policy field, 
owes more to the different scholarly traditions between the two areas 
than to the substance of any one particular economics model, such as the 
SCP approach.
The industrial economics field differs clearly in purpose, frame of 
reference and unit of analysis from the business policy field. Industrial 
economics is broader than business policy, examining the industry-wide 
factors influencing and influenced by what is being studied in the 
business policy area. Business policy is about helping individual firms 
attain their goals and it  has always been focused on firms' 'distinctive 
competence' and on what provides the basis for such uniqueness. 
Industrial economics is about understanding the relationships among 
firms, industries and economies, and in some cases industrial economics 
provides governments with the means to prevent firms from attaining 
their goals. Industrial economics is concerned with uncovering 
structure/performance relationships that generally hold true, even if  they
1 The discussion that follows is largely drawn from Porter (1981, p. 609-619)
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do not hold true in every industry and even if they are explained only by 
some variation in performance. The desire of industrial economics to 
advance public policy and improve overall economic welfare made such 
generalisations palatable.
The view of the decision-maker has been a major difference between the 
two fields. Industrial economics, by and large, viewed the firm as a single 
decision-making unit, making choices based on economic objectives. 
Contrary to this, business policy places great stress on how the 
personality of leader, political process within the firm, and a broader 
range of possible objectives have a major impact on the firm's actual 
behaviour in the marketplace.
The static perspective and limited view of the marketplace were obstacles 
hindering the flow of information between the two specialisms. Industrial 
economics viewed structure as being stable and exogenously determined 
and the firm's strategy and performance were fully determined by this 
structure. Business policy has a long tradition of emphasising the insight 
and creativity that firms have exhibited in fundamentally changing their 
environment and competing in their industry, and from their perspective 
the key question was what makes structure the way it is .
The differences in purpose, frame of reference, unit of analysis and 
related assumptions made the business policy practitioners 
uncomfortable about embracing industrial economics theory. However, 
notwithstanding this, and in particular recognising that the SCP was not 
developed to help individual firms, latter day industrial economics theory 
is now a very useful tool for use in business policy. Such theory offers the 
basis for developing a systematic model for analysing an industry and 
assessing the nature of competition in that industry and it casts the 
spotlight on the crucial aspects of the firm's industry.
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CHAPTER 2
TOWARDS AN INDUSTRY SPECIFIC FRAMEWORK
2.1 Introduction
The most fundamental point concerning any paradigm is to determine its 
purpose as it is naive and unrealistic to expect a single framework to be a 
panacea for all industrial economics or business policy ills. The revised 
framework outlined below has as its purpose the systematic analysis of 
the structural characteristics of a market, the assessment of how these 
characteristics influence the competitive dynamics within that market 
and the link between the competitive dynamics and the strategy adopted 
by the firms in the market. The framework does not seek to establish or 
prove any causal relationships nor does it subjectively assess the 
industry's overall performance against predetermined and socially 
desirable goals.
Using the traditional SCP as its base a revised framework postulates that 
the relationships among the three variables of structure, conduct and 
performance are complex and interactive (Martin, 1988, p. 7) and the 
causality still flows from the structural criteria (Ferguson, 1988, p. 11) 
(see Figure 2.1). The structural characteristics of the market will 
influence the behaviour of the individual firms and of firms collectively. 
These characteristics will also influence the strategic options available to 
the individual firms and based on the strategy chosen the firm should 
strive to insulate itself from the competitive forces by creating a 
sustainable competitive advantage. By measuring or monitoring its 
performance against a desired standard the strategy can be modified or 
altered to improve the performance.
The two primary dimensions of the revised framework are market
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structure and conduct. The importance attached to the dimension of 
performance is greatly reduced. The definition of performance in this 
framework is Bain's (1968, p 9) 'the composite of end results which firms 
in any market arrive at by pursuing whatever lines of conduct they 
espouse'. Thus performance is not the performance of the industry as a 
single entity but the performance of the individual firms against their 
predetermined objectives. Based on the assessment of their performance 
individual firms may choose to alter their strategy (conduct) and this in 
turn will influence the market structure; thus performance directly 
influences-conduct and indirectly influences market structure.
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The definition of market structure in this framework is Kock's (1980, 
p. 90) 'the relatively permanent strategic elements of the environment of 
a firm that influence, and are influenced by, the conduct and performance 
of the firm in the market in which it operates'. Three key elements of 





2 .2 .1  M ark et D efin itio n
The question as to what comprises an industry or a market is one that 
has plagued economists for a long time, and equally business policy 
practitioners have long argued over the definition of certain businesses.
In the theory of perfect competition the products supplied are 
homogeneous so there is no ambiguity and market definitions are clear 
and distinct. However, as soon as differences or flavours are introduced 
then the whole formulation of an industry becomes arbitrary and the 
relevant question is then at what point does one draw a line around a 
group of products and refer to it as an industry.
Lancaster (1966, p. 132-157) postulates that what consumers desire are 
not the goods themselves but the characteristics or qualities embodied in 
those goods; thus a good should be analysed as a bundle of qualities or 
characteristics. This provides a clear means of delineating between 
markets; products with similar traits or serving the same end use can be 
considered as existing in the same market. However, through product 
differentiation a producer can differentiate his product, on a physical or 
psychological basis, from his competitor's so that although the goods may 
be competing in the same market they are no longer viewed as perfect 
substitutes for each other; thus the qualities or characteristics of both 
goods are now viewed by the consumer as being different.
The purpose of product differentiation is to insulate the firm from 
competition by reducing the alternatives available to the consumer 
thereby lowering the price elasticity of demand. Product differentiation 
represents a departure from the conditions of perfectly competitive 
markets and the effect of this departure is to create downward sloping 
demand curves for the products concerned so that even assuming freedom 
of entry the market will not operate in a completely efficient manner 
(Howe, 1978, p.58). Product differentiation is unlikely to totally insulate 
a product from competition as competitors may farther differentiate their
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product so that they can eliminate the original product, thus potentially 
there is no limit to the degree of differentiation that may occur. Few 
products have the advantage of complete price inelasticity. When the 
price of the product rises consumers will investigate what alternatives 
they can use, and for industrial goods, firms may change the way they 
operate in order to cater for the new product.
The firm must compete not just against products that are clearly in its 
market but also against substitute products, products which in the view 
of the consumer perform the same function as the original item and are 
viewed as fully interchangeable with the original item. Substitute 
products limit the potential returns of an industry by placing a ceiling on 
the prices firms can profitably charge.
The threat from substitute products may be a matter for the collective 
industry rather than a problem for individual firms. Substitute products 
that are most potent are those that have a more favourable price- 
performance trade off vis-a-vis the original industry's product and 
substitute products produced by firms earning higher profits (Porter,
1980, p. 23-24).
For the individual firm knowing what market they are competing in is 
vital to their success and survival as an enterprise. Only by knowing their 
market can they develop their mission statement, analyse their market 
structure and devise strategies to compete successfully in that sector. 
Market definition is the foundation upon which any industrial 
organisation framework is based. Each market sector has its own 
concentration levels, entry barriers and other forces that shape and 
influence the competitive process within that sector.
2.2.2 Market Concentration.
Having determined the particular market sector that a firm is operating
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in the next stage is to review the competitors in that sector and their 
respective strengths and market share. Market concentration refers to the 
degree to 'which production for or in a particular market or industry is 
concentrated in the hands of a few large firms' (Clarke, 1985, p. 9). In 
measuring market concentration the concern is with an individual 
industry and the number and relative size of the firms in that industry as 
opposed to comparing one industry classification with another. A market 
is said to be more concentrated the fewer the number of firms in 
production or the more unequal the distribution of market share. The 
premise behind market concentration is that the more firms that exist in 
a market or the more equal the distribution of market share the more 
competitive that sector will be while the converse is also true.
Inequality in firm size or market share has serious implications for all the 
firms in an industry and for the efficient operation of that market as it 
reflects a move from perfect competition to a monopoly state. Sosnick 
(1958, p. 380-423) viewed the existence of an appreciable number of firms 
with no single firm being dominant as one of the characteristics of 
workable competition rather than perfect competition. Not only is the 
existence of inequality of market share or firm size critical to the 
understanding of an industry but the reasons behind such developments 
are of equal importance. Clarke (1985, p. 28-35) put forward two schools 
of thought relating to this. Firstly, there will be a determinate 
equilibrium level of concentration in a market at a point in time, 
determined by given demand and cost conditions and the behaviour of 
the market participants, and towards which the market will be 
continuously adjusting. Technological factors will play a key role in 
influencing this equilibrium by determining the efficient level of plant 
operations (minimum efficient scale relative to the market size). 
Accordingly, technological improvements by certain firms as illustrated 
by improvements in their scale economies will enable them to grow larger 
than their competitors. The assumption is that these improvements 
provide the firm with a lower selling price which attracts a greater
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demand and/or the improvement increases the profitability of the firm. 
Thus high profits may not be a sign of market power but of greater 
efficiency vis-a-vis other players in the market (Demsetz, 1973, p. 1-9).
The deterministic approach is a long run approach given that in certain 
markets plant capabilities and capacities cannot be increased over a short 
period of time due to the leadtime required to acquire additional capital 
equipment. This approach only reviews the number of firms that can 
operate given cost and demand conditions; it does not specifically address 
the market share inequalities of market concentration.
The second approach proposed by Clarke (1985, p. 33) is the stochastic 
approach which focus on the issue of actual concentration changes. This 
approach postulates that the actual process of concentration change 
reflects the net effect of a multitude of uncertain influences affecting the 
decisions and growth rates of individual firms. These influences include 
exchange rate movements, the success of an advertising campaign, a new 
product release, a merger or a price war. The important aspect of the 
stochastic approach is not what these influences are but that each firm's 
performance in a particular period is likely to be uncertain because of the 
multitudes of influences at work. The approach thus argues that "chance 
plays a crucial role in explaining concentration level changes but that 
such change is not random but is subject to general rules. Each firm faces 
a given probability distribution of proportionate growth which is 
independent of size (the law of proportionate affect), if  a number of firms 
are to face the same probability distribution of growth rates (which are 
independent of past growth rates) then the chance application of random 
variables will eventually produce a size distribution that is log normal, 
markets will become progressively dominated by fewer firms".
While the specific reasons behind the concentration levels is important 
this framework is more concerned with the results of market 
concentration and market share rather than with how it was achieved. 
While measures of market concentration are undoubtedly very important
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care needs to be taken to choose the measure most appropriate to the area 
of the industrial structure that is being investigated as different 
measures will produce different results. Concentration measures are 
statistical artifacts only and they only take on a meaning from the 
theoretical justification for constructing them in a particular way (Hay 
and Morris, 1980, p. 208).
Within the overall area of market concentration the relative 
concentration levels of the buyer and seller groups and the concentration 
levels within these groupings is a critical feature. Together the two 
groupings form a distinct cluster, firms that are linked through vertical 
(buyer / seller) or horizontal (common customers, technology etc) 
relationships (Porter, 1990, p.148-149). Such linkages can exist between 
firms within the same industry or between firms in different but related 
industries. As linked enterprises one group influences the other and 
changes in one will have a profound effect on the other. Porter (1990, p. 
151) states that "the cluster becomes a vehicle for maintaining diversity 
and overcoming the inward focus, inertia, inflexibility and 
accommodation among rivals that slows or blocks competitive upgrading 
and new entry. The presence of the cluster helps increase information 
flow, the likelihood of new approaches, and new entry from spin off, 
downstream, upstream and related industries". The phenomenon of 
clustering promotes the exchange and flow of information about the 
needs, techniques and technology among buyers, suppliers and related 
industries and it is the presence of entire clusters of industries that 
magnifies and accelerates the process of factor creation that is present 
when there is a group of domestic rivals. It is possible for clusters of 
connected industries and related firms to be a negative feature and a 
brake on innovation. Thus insular clusters may develop where firms, 
customers and suppliers only talk to each other (Porter, 1990, p. 171). The 
dynamics of clustering may also work in reverse if  firms are primary 
suppliers to, or otherwise connected to, the one or two industries in that 
cluster. The loss of one or all of these industries may well have a severe
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impact on the entire cluster (Porter, 1990, p. 172). Thus geographical 
clusters are very vulnerable.
The link between the buyer and seller groups is usually thought of as 
being the actual transfer of goods/services in return for payment, however 
this can hide the strategic importance of the link. Dicken (1986) outlined 
the major impact areas of linkages between firms and in addition to the 
above link other impact areas include the type and extent of technology 
transfer and the effect the linkage/cluster has on the concentration level 
of that sector and on the competitive position within that sector. The 
interdependence between buyers and sellers may be more significant than 
the actual commercial link between them. In some instances entire seller 
groups may have dedicated their entire output (or a significant 
proportion) to one particular buyer group and such sellers are therefore 
entirely dependent on this one group; in other cases sellers are linked to 
their customers as part of an overall strategy while in others the buyers 
may be dependent on their suppliers because they have created a item or 
set standards which can only be supplied and attained by local suppliers.
In their own right buyers compete within an industry by forcing prices 
down, demanding higher quality standards, better customer service 
standards and by playing the sellers off against each other at the expense 
of their overall profitability level. Powerful buyers can actually limit the 
returns in the seller's industry; conversely sellers can exert bargaining 
power over the buyers by raising prices, reducing quality standards or 
lowering customer service levels. Powerful sellers can squeeze the 
profitability of the buyers' industry as well as reducing their ability to 
control and manage their raw material supply. A firm's choice of buyers 
(customers) or sellers (suppliers) is a crucial strategic decision; a firm can 
improve its strategic position by finding buyers / sellers who possess the 
least power to influence it adversely and who in turn they can manoeuvre 
for their own benefit. Equally a firm can benefit by choosing suppliers / 
customers that will have a positive influence on them by exposing them to
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new id eas or technology and su bsequent im provem ent.
A buyer group is considered to be powerful if  the following circumstances 
hold true (Porter, 1980, p. 24);
* It is more concentrated than the seller group and / or purchases large 
volumes relative to seller's sales.
*The product it purchases from the seller group represents a significant 
fraction of the buyer's costs or purchases.
*The product purchased is a standard product or is undifferentiated .
*It faces few switching costs.
*It earns low profits.
*The buyers pose a credible threat of backward integration.
*The industry's product is unimportant to the quality of the buyers's 
products or services.
*The buyer has full information.
A seller group is considered to be powerful if  the following apply (Porter, 
1980, p. 27);
*The seller group is dominated by a few companies and is more 
concentrated than the industry it sells to .
*The seller's product does not contend with substitute products.
*The buyer's industry is not an important customer of the seller's 
industry.
*The supplier's product is an important input into the buyer's business. 
*The supplier group products are undifferentiated or have built in 
switching costs.
*The supplier group poses a credible threat of forward integration.
Semlinger's (1991) work on the outsourcing industry (where outsourcing 
refers to the market procurement of formerly in-house produced goods 
and services from legally independent supplier firms) augments the
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traditional view of the buyer-supplier relationships. While his work 
relates to one specific type of activity it  does have significance for all 
forms of buyer-supplier relationships.
Semlinger (1991, p. 109) contends that the buyer-supplier relation striven 
for is one of 'autonomy and domination', that is suppliers are formally 
independent, but can nevertheless be stirred by the purchasing company 
which defines the 'terms of trade'. Autonomy to supplier units in this kind 
of relationship is granted in order to mobilise knowledge and creativity by 
making use of market incentives and competition as a discovery and 
selection device. Autonomy also achieves a second goal. It absolves the 
buyer from assuming responsibility for the outcome of the agreed 
conditions of exchange. Thus autonomy of the supplier under domination 
of the buyer makes better use of market features as a disciplinary device.
In addition, Semlinger's (1991, p. 99) view of modem purchasing policies 
is that they are moving in the direction of an "intensification of 
inter-company co-operation (between the buyer and seller)". However, 
essentially it  is the supplier who adapts to the demands of the customer, 
with these demands increasing in number and standard; competitive 
price and continuing price decreases are taken for granted, expectations 
with regard to flexibility have increased with supply being carried out in 
shorter time frames and the deviations tolerated in terms of delivery 
dates, amounts delivered and product quality becoming narrower. The 
accompanying services now expected from suppliers include better 
financing arrangements, intensified quality monitoring and 
documentation, increased stockpiling and improved communication 
facilities. At the same time the number of suppliers is being continually 
reduced.
Interdependence in buyer-supplier relationships is not guaranteed. 
Mutuality exists only to the extent that the buyer and supplier are 
dependent on the sale of the final product. The buyer is only dependent
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on the supplier to the extent that there is no better alternative supply. In 
order to increase the buyer's dependency the supplier has to improve its 
competitive performance and to adapt further to the customer's needs. 
Semlinger (1991) does contend that it is not it is not always possible for 
buyers to exploit their suppliers' 'passive flexibility', that is their 
pliability to external force; some suppliers may be of equal strength, or 
they may be indispensable, or they may have alternative opportunities at 
their disposal which allows them to refuse or withdraw from unfair 
contracting. Semlinger (1991) also contends that in some cases it may not 
be necessary for buyers to exploit their suppliers because of real 
advantages offered by the supplier in terms of productivity and 'active 
flexibility' that is versatility with regard to innovative options.
2.2.3 Entry Conditions
While there is widespread agreement that competitive entry (and exit) 
into an industry is a very important feature there is no agreed definition 
of a barrier impeding entry into a market. Entry conditions define a 
relationship between firms already established in a market and potential 
entrants into that market and they are a measure of the advantage 
possessed by established firms over potential entrants. It is the 
possibility or threat of new entrants into a market which eliminates long 
run monopoly profits; conversely it is the absence of such entry that 
allows supernormal profits to be earned.
Demsetz (1982) and Brozen (1975) sought to restrict the idea of entry 
barriers to government based restrictions to market entry. The basis for 
this is that entry barriers can arise only from government intervention 
because only the government has the legal power to prevent entry into a 
market. Without such intervention it is argued that the free workings of 
the competitive economy will eradicate monopoly rents in the long run 
and thus only governments have the power to prevent free competition. 
This definition is very narrow and places considerable faith in the
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workings of the marketplace. Stigler (1968, p. 67) on the other hand views 
entry barriers as a cost of producing (at some or every rate) which must 
be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by 
firms already in that industry. Based on this definition, when established 
firms and new entrants face the same cost and demand conditions in a 
market then there is no barrier to entry. Bain (1968, p. 68) views a 
barrier to entry as reflecting 'the extent to which, in the long rim, 
established firms can elevate their selling price above the minimal 
average cost of production and distribution (those costs associated with 
operating at optimal scales) without inducing potential entrants to enter 
that industry'. Bain maintains that there is a maximum selling price 
which firms can charge without inducing actual entry, the maximum 
entry forestalling price. This is measured numerically as the percentage 
by which the maximum entry forestalling price exceeds the minimum 
attainable average cost of established firms. A factor complicating this 
definition is that it implicitly assumes that those seeking to enter a 
market will be new (and small) firms. Andrews (1964) argues that entry 
is much more likely from established multiproduct firms which decide to 
diversify into a new market. Pickering (1974, p. 70-73) supports this 
views and notes that these firms are 'established' firms (albeit in another 
market) and will probably have access to financial resources, 
management ability, and technical commonality. Consequently the 
barriers preventing entry for established firms are likely to be much less 
than for entirely new enterprises.
A development strongly linked to the concept of barriers to entry is that of 
'contestable markets' (Baumol, 1982). In a perfectly contestable market 
the incumbent firms are not protected in any way from potential entry. 
The market is completely open to potential competition, potential 
entrants would operate under identical cost conditions as the established 
firms and potential entrants are able to enter and leave the industry at 
no net cost. Under these conditions the established firms have little or no 
monopoly power. Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) have shown that, in
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contrast to the perfect competition model, duopoly is sufficient to produce 
a perfectly contestable market. As a contributor to public and welfare 
policy this concept is very important as it places particular emphasis on 
potential rather than actual competition as a mechanism for resource 
allocation and as a consequence greater emphasis should be placed on 
increasing the contestability in markets rather than preventing 
concentration increases. From the individual firm's viewpoint it is to their 
advantage if  they can insulate themselves from potential competition 
thereby reducing the contestability of their market and affording 
themselves an opportunity to earn higher profits.
Bain (1956) suggested that barriers to entry stem from one or more of 
three sources, and in all industries it is the aggregate of all of the barriers 
that determines the degree of difficulty of entry into that market rather 
than the influence of any one single barrier. The three sources are;
(a) Product differentiation
(b) Absolute cost advantage
(c) Economies of scale
(a) Product Differentiation
A  product differentiation barrier exists because producers in the 
marketplace enjoy the goodwill or inertia on the part of the consumers 
which makes them unwilling to try something different. Such preferences 
can arise where established firms have exclusive control of superior 
product design through patent protection or established firms may have 
established a high level of customer goodwill by supplying a quality 
product or service. Potential entrants must overcome this inertia by 
offering a similar product (with similar average cost conditions) at a lower 
price and hence a lower profit (or a loss), or by spending additional 
resources on production promotion and advertising in order to conquer 
existing customer habits. Either of these alternatives involves additional 
costs and reduced revenues for the potential entrants and it is the extent
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of these costs and reduced revenue which creates the barrier behind 
which existing firms can raise their selling price above the average cost.
(b) Absolute Cost Advantage
An absolute cost barrier to entry relates to the ability of established firms 
to produce any given level of output at a lower unit cost than potential 
entrants (Clarke, 1985, p. 74). In this case existing firms may enjoy 
supernormal profits in relation to their average costs without inducing 
competitive entry (Howe, 1978, p.61).
Two possible sources of absolute cost advantage e x ist;
(1) Superior Production Techniques relative to the potential entrant. 
These may exist through patents or as a result of experience in dealing in 
the market. These techniques may manifest themselves in the learning 
or experience curve, where there is an observed tendency for unit costs
to decline as the firm gains more cumulative experience producing the 
product. Costs decline as workers improve their methods and become 
more experienced, plant layout improves, specialised equipment may be 
developed or standard equipment may be customised.
(2) Favourable access to resources (or access to superior resources) 
relative to the potential entrant. Established firms may have locked up 
the most favourable sources of raw material at very favourable prices. 
Additionally the established firms may be better able to attract a superior 
or cheaper pool of labour or it may have access to same. They may also 
have a favourable location because of rent charges, proximity to raw 
materials, transport routes or customers. The established firm may have 
access to the most favourable distribution channels thus making it more 
difficult for the potential entrant to get their products to the marketplace. 
Access to capital or the availability of capital at a cost less than that 
available to the competitors, and access to a pool of management skills
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and expertise constitutes an absolute advantage.
(c) Economies of Scale
Economies of scale arise when long run average costs decline as output 
expands and occur due to the existence of non-proportional 
inputs; costs which rise less than proportionately with output. This entry 
barrier arises because new entrants are unable to secure full 
advantages of their scale without contributing a significant share of the 
industry's output. If  the firm enters at or above the minimum efficient 
scale (the lowest point at which full scale economies are achieved) it 
makes a significant contribution to the industry's output and is likely to 
cause a substantial drop in market price (possibly to below its unit cost). 
Alternatively, if  it enters at less than the minimum efficient level it will 
suffer a cost disadvantage. Scale economies are present in every 
function of a business, including manufacturing, purchasing, research 
and development, marketing and distribution (Porter, 1980, p.7).
Supplementing the three barriers proposed by Bain (1956) two additional 




Capital requirements act a barrier to entry if  there is a need to invest in 
'up front' activities such as plant and equipment or advertising. This 
places the potential entrant at a cost disadvantage relative to established 
firms as the latter has already invested in these activities. New entrants 
may have difficulty in raising funds at a competitive rate (relative to 
those being charged to established firms) as entry into the market may be 
viewed as a risky use of the capital reflected in a higher premia being
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charged, or the funds may not be available in the desired amounts.
Capital is necessary not only for production facilities but also for extra 
services now expected from suppliers (see pg. 17) such as customer credit, 
inventories (both of raw materials and finished goods), staff overheads for 
indirect functions such as quality and administration.
Bain viewed the principal effect of capital as being to reduce the pool of 
potential entrants rather than representing a barrier to entry of all 
prospective entrants (Clarke, 1985, p. 77).
(e) Switching costs
Switching costs represent a once off cost incurred by the buyer in 
switching from an established supplier to the new entrant. The 
switching cost may include employee retraining, cost of ancillary 
equipment, cost and time in testing or approving a new source. This 
barrier corresponds with Stigler's definition. In addition to the actual cost 
involved the customer faces very real risks involved in switching 
suppliers. There is a risk that the new supplier will not attain the 
standard of the other suppliers or of the displaced supplier, the risk that 
a poor quality product could be supplied or that the product will not be 
delivered on time, this is especially true if  the customers has adopted a 
just in time delivery philosophy. The higher the standards set by the 
buyer the greater the risk that a potential supplier will not attain those 
standards. These risks on their own may be sufficient to insulate the 
established supplier from the threat of potential competitors and if they 
are combined with an actual switch cost, they form a very potent barrier 
to entry. There is also a psychological cost involved in severing 
established business relationships, especially if  these relationships have 
been long established and successful and are based around specific 
individuals.
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2 .2 .4  T he R ole o f P rice & E n try  D eterren t T actics
The role of price is central to microeconomic theory but the importance 
attached to it in the overall competitive process cannot be gauged with 
any certainty. Firms differ in their management expertise, application 
and effort with regard to their pricing decision. This results in different 
degrees of importance being attached to pricing and different degrees of 
sophistication being exhibited in the pricing decision process.
Increasingly price is being viewed as but one, and sometimes a relatively 
minor, competitive instrument, along with advertising and product 
differentiation (Hay and Morris, 1980, p. 113). In recent times product 
quality and after sale service have also become important competitive 
instrument. Silberston (1970, p. 511-582) has emphasised that it is not 
always clear what is meant by 'price'. Published or quoted prices may 
differ from actual transacted prices, special deals or offers, negotiations or 
secret price reductions all help to ensure that the definition of a market 
price remains ambiguous.
In microeconomic theory the overall pricing decision for producers in 
competition with each other or for monopolists is straight forward, it is in 
the area of oligopoly that this decision becomes ambiguous. Here, in the 
absence of formal restrictive trading agreements, the interdependence 
brought about by the number of suppliers produces a mutual respect for 
each other and each firm's reaction to individual pricing and output 
decisions is not known with any degree of certainty; there is always a 
fear for individual producers that their competitors will not follow their 
price increases but will follow any price reduction. The existence of a 
kinked demand curve facing individual producers is held to account for 
two aspects of business pricing behaviour; the tendency for individual 
oligopolists to hold their selling price constant despite changes in cost or 
demand conditions and the corresponding tendency for all producers 
within an oligopoly to change their selling price at the same time and in 
line with each other (Howe, 1978, p. 65).
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The desire of potential entrants to enter a market stems from their belief 
that they can make an attractive profit from the new market. Therefore, if  
the established players can manipulate the market price (and accordingly 
profits) then they can also manipulate entry into that market. If  the price 
is above the maximum entry forestalling price then it will give rise to 
potential new entrants and to reductions in the established firm's market 
share and profits in the long run, On the other hand if  the price is lower 
than the maximum entry forestalling price entry will not be forthcoming 
and current profits and market share will continue in the long run.
While the control of pricing is a very important method of restricting 
entry into a market the application of it in practice is extremely difficult. 
Clarke (1985, p. 85-87) outlined four criticisms of such price limiting 
policies. Firstly, the idea that established firms can co-ordinate their 
activities to set the limit on price is a major assumption that may not be 
folly true. Oligopolistic co-ordination is extremely difficult in any market 
and is contrary to current legislation in virtually all countries. 
Consequently, markets where entry is ineffectively impeded would be 
more prevalent than those where it is effectively impeded. Secondly, 
price limiting theory assumes that established firms want to deter entry 
absolutely. This may not be the case. Gaskin (1971, p. 306-322) believes 
that the preference may be to regulate the rate of entry as the market 
changes over time rather than to deter it totally. Thirdly, the limit price 
theory is criticised for its assumption that the prospect of negative (or 
lower than expected profits) is sufficient to deter entry. Bhagwati (1970, 
p. 297-310) argues that i f  all firms make losses after entry occurs the new 
entrant will not necessarily be squeezed out. The new entrant may make 
smaller losses than the established players and all firms differ in their 
ability to survive a period of loss making. A new entrant may be prepared 
to accept a loss in an initial break-in period if  it felt that its product 
would eventually become firmly established . The final criticism is based 
on the Sylos postulate, an integral part of the limit price theory, which
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assumes that when entry occurs the established firms will maintain their 
current rates of production. Of this Clarke (1985, p.86) says "it (Sylos 
postulate) is arbitrary. There is no reason why the new entrant should 
expect the established firm to maintain their pre-entry output levels after 
entry". Thus the actual response, both its type and intensity, of the 
established firms cannot be known with certainty.
Accordingly entry into a market can be impeded by influencing the 
potential entrants expectations towards a more pessimistic outcome of 
post-entry competition, thereby hoping that they will assume that it is not 
worth their while entering the market. The crucial question for the 
potential entrant is the not the pre-entry condition of the market but its 
post entry condition and the reaction of the established firms to the new 
entrant. This reaction may take many forms depending on the particular 
market circumstances. Possible actions include pricing tactics (including 
predatory pricing), increased advertising, special promotional dealings 
with customers or distributors. Schelling (1960) suggested that an 
effective entry deterrent tactic is for the established firm to commit itself 
to a certain line of action should entry actually take place, for example by 
carrying excess plant capacity. Such an action demonstrates a 
commitment to the industry and since the investment in capacity is more 
or less irreversible it may make the threat of price competition more 
credible. Spence (1977, p. 534-544) in particular advocated the idea that 
capacity is an effective deterrent to entry. The notion of using excess 
capacity as a deterrent to entry can be bolstered if  such an investment 
represents a sunk and non-recoverable cost. Product or brand 
proliferation is another possible entry deterrent tactic. Such a policy 
involves established firms packing the market with a variety of products 
or brands or services so that there is insufficient room for a new firm's 
products to compete profitably.
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2.3 Conduct
Bain (1968, p. 9) defined market conduct as 'the patterns of behaviour 
that enterprises follow in adapting or adjusting to the markets in which 
they sell (or buy)'. Market conduct equates to the strategy that a firm 
chooses to follow. The traditional microeconomic models of the firm 
portrayed it as having only one objective; profit maximisation subject to 
cost and revenue constraints. However, the discretion over the firm's 
objectives afforded to that firm's key individuals and the separation of 
ownership and control has resulted in a firm having many different 
objectives, which may or may not include that of profit maximisation.
Every firm that competes in an industry has a competitive strategy, 
whether explicit or implicit. This strategy may have been developed 
explicitly through a planning process or it  may have evolved implicitly 
through the activities of the various functional departments. Strategy can 
be divided into two related but distinct parts (Christensen, 1982, p. 93). 
Corporate strategy shapes and reveals the organisation's objectives and 
goals, it produces policies and plans for the attainment of these objectives 
and it defines the business that the company intends to be in and the 
kind of organisation (economic and social) it wants to be. Business 
strategy, which is derived from the corporate strategy, outlines how a 
company will compete in a given market and how it should position itself 
vis-a-vis its competitors; it defines the tactics the firm will use against its 
competitors .
An effective business strategy will seek to take offensive or defensive 
action in order to create a defendable position against the changing 
competitive forces in the marketplace while at the same time providing 
the firm with a competitive advantage over its competitors. By adopting 
specific strategies and tactics a firm can actually alter the structure of its 
market in its favour (Spence, 1979, p. 1-9; Salop, 1979, p.335-338).
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2 .3 .1  G eneric S tr a te g ie s
Although the environment that a firm operates in is very broad, 
encompassing social, political and economic forces, the key aspect of the 
firm's environment is the industry that it competes in. While this is 
identical for all firms competing in that industry the strategies developed 
to compete and to develop a competitive advantage will be different and 
unique to each competitor. At a very broad level Porter (1980, p. 34-46) 
outlined three generic strategies for achieving a competitive advantage 
and a firm must make a choice between these three fundamentally 
different strategies because the functional requirements and 
organisational needs of each are significantly different. Firms not 
following any of these individual strategies will be 'stuck in the middle' 
and are almost guaranteed low profitability (Porter, 1980, p. 41).
The three generic strategies are;1
A Overall Cost Leadership Strategy 
B Differentiation Strategy 
C Focused Strategy
A  Overall Cost Leadership Strategy
The theme running through this strategy is to be a low cost producer 
relative to the competition across the entire product line in the industry. 
Attaining a position of cost leadership requires a thorough knowledge of 
the actual costs, a vigorous pursuit of cost reductions, tight overhead 
control and cost minimisation in all areas and a great deal of managerial 
attention to control costs. A low cost position is not equivalent to a low 
price strategy. Low price can be a chosen position in the marketplace, 
whereas low cost means a firm has the lowest cost of getting a product to 
the marketplace. Once a low cost position has been achieved the firm can 
choose to compete at a low price thereby squeezing the competitors or
1 The discussion on each of these in the pages that follow is drawn from Porter (1980, p. 34-46, 127-155).
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it can compete at the 'market price' and earn above average returns .
Having a low cost position yields the firm above average returns 
irrespective of the presence of strong competitive forces. Such a strategy 
gives the firm a defensive position against rivalry from competitors 
because its lower costs means that it can still earn returns after its 
competitors have competed away their profits through rivalry. It also 
defends the firm against powerful buyers because buyers can only exert 
power to drive down prices to the next most efficient producer and the 
less efficient competitors will suffer first in the face of competitive 
pressure.
A cost leadership position can be vulnerable if technological change 
nullifies past investment or learning, and allows industry newcomers or 
followers to invest in low cost product methods. Equally, the firm focused 
exclusively on costs may be unable to see required product or marketing 
changes and may find its market evaporates. To continue its cost 
leadership position a firm needs to control the costs of its inputs; should 
these rise (due to exogenous influences) the price differential between the 
low cost producer and those pursuing a differential strategy may narrow 
and may not be sufficient to retain the market share.
B Differentiation Strategy
The cornerstone of this strategy is one of differentiating the product so 
that it is perceived as being a unique and it does not have to compete 
against substitute products. Differentiation can take many forms such as 
brand image or perceived differences in technology, customer services and 
product design, product quality or after sales services.
Differentiation is a viable strategy for earning above average returns 
because it creates brand loyalty and provides insulation from price 
competition and substitute products as it effectively limits buyers' power.
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A differentiation strategy may be viewed as a short term strategy rather ‘ 
than a longer term one unless the competitive advantage that exists can 
only be replicated in the long term; competitors will attempt to further 
distinguish their products so at to eliminate the original product or to 
make their products as differentiated. The insulation from price 
competition provided by this strategy cannot be permanent unless the 
product has an inelastic demand and consumers, especially industrial 
consumers, will not continually tolerate price increases but will 
investigate alternative products to satisfy their needs.
Differentiation involves a number of risks. The cost differential between 
low cost producers and the differentiated firm may become too great for 
differentiation to hold the brand loyalty; buyers thus sacrifice some of the 
features, services or images possessed by the differentiated firm for larger 
savings and imitations may narrow the perceived difference especially if 
these are available at a lower cost.
C Focused Strategy
The essence of this strategy is that the firm concentrates entirely on one 
particular sector, buyer group, product line or geographical area. The 
entire strategy focuses on serving the particular target market very well 
and all functional areas operate with this in mind. A focused strategy 
rests on the premise that the firm is best able to serve its narrow target 
market more effectively than their competitors who are competing more 
broadly. Within this overall strategy the firm will strive for either an 
overall cost leadership strategy or a differentiation strategy in order to 
serve the target market effectively.
A focused strategy can be viewed as a high risk strategy as the failure of 
the target market (customer, geographical region, etc) would have a 
serious consequence for the firm as it is totally dependent on its target 
market. It also faces a challenge from competitors that find sub markets
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w ith in  th e  focu sed  m a rk et th u s  o u tfocu sin g  th e  focuser.
2.3.2 Dimensions of Generic Strategy
Within the three generic strategies a firm can choose to formulate its 
strategy along specific dimensions; thus firms who have adopted the same 
generic strategy could go about implementing this strategy in a variety of 
ways. The strategic dimensions relevant to this framework are;
(i) Specialisation: the degree to which the firm focuses its efforts in terms 
of width of its product lines, the target customer segments or the 
geographical markets served.
(ii) Technological position: the degree to which the firm seeks a position of 
technical leadership. Here technology refers to both product and process, 
and it is the latter which is of particular relevance in this framework.
(iii) Cost position and price policy, the extent to which it seeks the low 
cost position in manufacturing and distribution through investment in 
cost minimising facilities and equipment. Price policy refers to the firm's 
relative price position in the market and its pricing philosophy. The firm 
can choose to be the price leader in the industry or to price discrimination 
tactics. Price position will usually be related to other variables such as 
cost position and quality.
(iv) Quality position: the firm's level of product and process quality. The 
assumption underpinning the importance of quality is that the customer 
(industrial or consumer) will always choose the most superior product, the 
one with the highest quality standard, and that a high quality product 
does not necessarily mean a high price. Quality is referred to as an all 
embracing concept and goes further than the traditional view of being 
confined to a quality control department and of being inspected into the 
product by eliminating the defective products. Quality includes product
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quality, the process quality, workmanship standards, the quality of the 
after sales service and the quality of the service from all business 
functions not just the manufacturing function. Based on Lancaster's 
(1966) definition of a product as a bundle of characteristics or attributes 
desired by the customer, it is ultimately the customer that decides on the 
level of quality they desire; thus the definition of quality is subjective.
(v) Vertical integration: the extent of value added as reflected in the level 
of forward / backward integration adopted.
2.3.2 The Role of A Sustainable Competitive Advantage
Every firm, through its strategy, seeks to create and maintain a 
sustainable competitive advantage over its competitor. Such an 
advantage is one where the strategy is based not on equivalence but on 
dimensions that set the company apart. It is based not on the 
improvement of some facet of the firm's business but on improvements 
relative to its competitors and the advantage is sustainable if  it  can not 
be readily copied. A sustainable advantage is one where competitors are 
slow to notice the change and / or a slow to react to it, thus the time lag 
until it is copied is long thereby giving the firm an opportunity to exploit 
the advantage.
In seeking its position of uniqueness there are two fundamental types of 
competitive advantages that a firm can possess; lower cost and / or 
product differentiation, and every truly successful strategy that 
outperforms competitors exploits one or both of these sources of 
competitive advantage (Christensen, 1982, p. 100).
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CHAPTER 3
The Print (and Publishing) Industry
Having described an appropriate framework for examining the software 
manual printing sector in chapter 2, we turn in chapter 4 to an 
application of that framework to that industry. In this chapter we 
describe the main features of the broader industrial context within which 
or out of which the software manual printing industry has emerged.
The print and publishing sector ( NACE 473/474) covers every variety of 
printed goods, from newspapers and calendars to books and cheques. The 
main sectors of the Irish printing industry are newspaper printing which 
accounts for 33.3% of the industry's turnover and general printing which 
accounts for over 30% of the work. The 'general printing' sector is an all 
embracing sector covering a multitude of printed matter that is not 
conveniently covered by any other category within the NACE 
classification. Almost 90% of the industry's exports go to Europe with the 
UK being the main trading partner, accounting for 53% of exports. The 
UK represents 77% of print imports.
The demand for printed products is a derived demand, being derived from 
the activities in other economic areas. For example, the demand for school 
books is derived from the school going population and is influenced by the 
developments in the educational curriculum and in the second hand 
school book market. The print industry is unique insofar as it is not 
responsible for selling the item it produces, rather it is only concerned 
with selling its machine hours and associated expertise; it is the print 
publisher responsibility to ensure that the printed items are sold. The 
understanding of this is critical to the understanding of the print 
industry as a whole. As a consequence of selling its machine time the 
critical factor for the print industry is to maximise the number of saleable 
machine hours that are available and to maximise the revenue (and
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minimise the costs) for each of these hours. Anything that prevents this 
is an obstacle to increased profitability in the industry. The installed 
equipment restricts or limits the type of print work that a supplier can 
produce thus limiting its customer base, forcing the individual print 
suppliers to concentrate within specific sub sections of this overall NACE 
classification (and within specific sectors of the general printing sector).
The print and publishing industry makes a significant contribution to the 
national economy, being valued at £502m (gross output) and £311 million 
per annum (net output). It is largest single employer in any three digit 
NACE classification employing 11,053 people, which represents 5.8% of 
the total manufacturing workforce and it accounts for 3.6% of the net 
output of all manufacturing firms (CSO, 1992).
The structure of the printing industry worldwide is characterised by the 
multiplicity of small scale establishments and Ireland is no exception to 
this (Table 3.1). Many of these firms have been set up as offshoots of 
larger firms by entrepreneurial craftsman once they have qualified and 
there is an increasing trend towards further fragmentation into smaller 
business establishment (establishments with less than 50 employees) 
(Table 3.2). This fragmentation is a problem for the industry as it 
contributes to the instability of its financial performance.
Geographically the printing industry is heavily concentrated in the 
Dublin region, which accounts for 72% of the industry's employment 
(Table 3.3).
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Breakdown of Print 
Establishments by Size
Firm size by 











Table 3.1 Source CSO, 1993
From 1981 to 1985 employment levels in this industry declined by 14.2% 
(from 11522 to 9876) (Table 3.4 ). This decline was less than the decline 
in the overall manufacturing employment over the same period (18.3%), 
thus the rate of job losses in the printing industry appears to be less than 
that in the manufacturing sector in general (NACE 1 to 4, less NACE 
11,12,16,17,21 and 23). Since 1985 employment in this sector has 
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11-49 171 157 148
50-99 28 28 27
100 + 19 16 13
Total 368 364 349





























Table 3.4 Source CSO, 1993
Employment levels in this sector are strongly influenced by the trade 
unions in the form of strict manning levels and rigid demarcation lines. 
Such is the power of these unions that the manning levels have not 
declined significantly with the advent of improved technology,
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mechanisation, and computerisation. In the three years 1987-89 this 
sector has invested £85m in plant and equipment however the wages and 
salaries cost as a percentage of gross output has only declined from 33% 
to 32%. Present manning levels and hourly wage rates in the industry are 
unrealistically high and they reflect the bygone age when print was a 
craft rather than a commodity. These problems of over manning and 
restrictive practices were noted by the policy submission made by the 
Federation of Print Paper and Board Industries (FPPBI, 1992). This 
submission noted that the manning levels and demarcation lines have 
lead to uncompetitive work practices and in a survey by the FPPBI of 
print executives there was a general view that the operation of work 
practices and demarcation rules were significant barriers to change 
within the industry while the overall role of the unions was considered to 
be obstructive.
The net output per employee (where net output represents the value 
added to industrial input) in the print industry compares very poorly to 
overall manufacturing. The employees in the print industry have a lower 
output per employee while simultaneously enjoying a higher wages per 
employee figure. Over the period 1980 to 1989, the differential in net 
output per employee has increased from 20% to 59% in favour of the 
manufacturing employee while while the wage and salaries cost per 
employee were, on average, 14% higher in favour of the print employee 
(Table 3.5). This poor performance may be attributed, among other 
factors, to over manning, higher wage cost and inefficiencies due to 
demarcation.
When broken down by the size of the establishment a clear trend emerges 
that the larger the establishment (in terms of employees) the more 
inefficient it is in comparison to a similarly sized manufacturing 
establishment, based on net output and wages per employee. Print 
establishments with 10 or less employees have 8.6% less net output per 
employee while wage cost per employee are 1.7% higher than a
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comparable manufacturing operation. At the other end of the spectrum, 
print establishments with 50 employees or more are producing 25% less 
net output per employee and have 16% higher wages cost per employee 
than a comparable manufacturing operation (CSO, 1993). These figures 
give credence to the notion that the larger the establishment the more 
manning levels and demarcation adversely affect its performance.
By comparison to the UK print and publishing industry the indigenous 
industry performs very poorly (Table 3.6). Domestic wage costs per 
employee are higher than in the UK while net output per employee is 
lower. The FPPBI publication (1992) dted that domestic wage costs per 
employee are 32% higher than those in the UK while net output per 
employee is 34% lower than in the UK. The 1988 Labour Cost Survey 
supports the arguments that indigenous wage costs are higher than those 
in the UK, although it illustrates a significantly lower differential (Table 
3.7). Irrespective of what the correct wage differential is the main point 
is that the wage costs within the print sector are higher than in the UK.
The UK printing industry has acknowledged that its productivity levels 
remain unfavourable versus Japan and the Far East and that its hourly 
wage rates remain unrealistically high (HMSO, 1992,). To achieve higher 
rates of return productivity improvements need to be implemented either 
demanning and increased automation with the objective of increasing the 
contribution per machine hour of print produced. Given that the print 
industry is selling its machine time a critical factor for it  to maximise its 
revenue will be the minimisation of machine downtime due to 
make-ready and job-changes/times and minimising both direct and 
indirect labour costs.
The uncompetitiveness of this sector was noted in the Mclver report 
(1977) on the industry which stated that the future competitiveness 
would be severely constrained unless the levels of productivity could be 
improved significantly. According to this report the the level of poor
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p rod u ctiv ity  w a s a ttr ib u ta b le  to  tw o factors ;
(a) The retention of surplus labour
(b) Slower improvement in work practices
The Mclver report also noted that slower improvements in technology 
contributed to the lower level of productivity. While recent figures would 
indicate that this sector has advanced along the technological road these 
improvements have not been matched by improvements in the overall 
productivity levels because of the manning levels and rigid demarcation 
lines. One of the tangible signs of these inefficiencies is the high and 
increasing levels of book imports with an increasing number of Irish book 
publishers printing their books abroad. Gill & Macmillian claim that 
foreign prices can be up to 20% lower than those quoted by indigenous 
suppliers and even with the transport costs it is more cost effective for 
them to import their books (internal source).
Comparison between the Print Industry and Manufacturing*
Net Output per Employee Wages per Employee
Print Manuf % Print Manuf %
£ £ Difference £ £ Difference
1981 12500 15000 20 7203 6188 14
1982 14700 17800 21 8468 7073 19
1983 15000 22000 46 9068 8013 11
1984 18000 26000 44 10383 8927 14
1985 20700 29000 41 11077 9773 12
1986 22500 31000 37 12041 10393 14
1987 24100 35000 45 12849 11072 14
1988 25900 40000 54 13413 11638 13
1989 28200 45000 59 14466 12152 16
* Manufacturing represents NACE 1 to 4, less NACE 11,12,16,17,21 and 23.
Table 3.5 Source CSO, 1993
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Comparison between the UK and Irish Print Industry
Wage Cost Per 
Employee Net Output Per Employee
Ireland UK Ireland U K
£ £ £ £
1988 12500 8500 25900 34500
*UK figures converted at an exchange rate of £0.90 
Table 3.6 Source; PPBBI 1992
Wage Cost Comparison between Ireland and UK 
(NACE 473/4)
Ireland UK
Hourly Wage Costs 13.29 13.23
Monthly Wage Costs 2056 2044
Based in ECU
Table 3.7 Source; 1988 Labour Cost Survey
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CHAPTER 4
The Software Manual Printing Sector
4.1 Introduction
The demand in the software manual printing sector is a derived demand, 
being derived and dependent on the activities in the software publishing 
sector. The software publishing sector is composed of the software 
producing (publishing) firms that 'generate at least 50% of their revenues 
from personal software development or publishing' ('Softletter' 
publication definition). This definition precludes firms that write 
software for specific installations or specific computers (mainframes or 
minis). As the core business of these publishers is the development and 
publishing of software in a wider sense they can be viewed as developing 
and selling technology.
Over the last 5 years the software publishing sector has experienced 
phenomenal growth with an average annual growth rate of 34% for the 
period 1987-1991. In 1991 the top 100 software publishers had total 
worldwide revenues of $7,557 billion which represented an increase of 
32% on the 1990 figure, which in turn was 34% higher than the 1989 
level (Softletter report 1992).
The software publishing sector is a very concentrated industrial sector,
the one firm concentration ratio (based on sales revenues) is 30%, while
the top three software publishers account for 50% of the industry's
revenue, and the top 12 publishers account for 79% of the revenue. These
figures reflect an increase on the previous year illustrating that the
market is becoming more concentrated (Table 4.1). The salient feature of
the concentration level is the one firm concentration level; the dominance
of Microsoft. In 1991 Microsoft's worldwide revenues were $2,275 billion
which equated to 30% of the industry's revenues, this percentage has
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increased from 25% in 1990 and 22.5% in 1989. Microsoft's revenue 
growth has surpassed any of its rivals with its 1991 revenue growth being 
57% (as compared to average of 21% growth for the next five largest 
publishers) (Table 4.2). Microsoft’s dominance is so great that the 
combined revenues of the next three largest software publishers (Lotus, 
Novell and Wordperfect) do not surpass its revenues ($ 2.275b v $2.000b).
Concentration Ratios* in the Software 
Publishing Sector
cr 1 cr 2 cr 3 cr 6 cr 12
1990 25 37 46 62 76
1991 30 41 50 67 79
* Based on sales revenue
Table 4.1 Source: Softletter 1992,1991
The software industry has become a global industry with an increasing 
proportion of total worldwide sales revenue being generated from markets 
outside of the USA, international sales. In 1991 the top 100 software 
publishers generated 45% of their total worldwide revenues from such 
international sales as compared to 37% in 1990 and this trend is expected 
to continue. Furthermore in 1991 international sales increased at a rate 
of 34% as compared to a rate of 24% for domestic USA sales, this was the 
first occasion that sales outside of the USA exceeded domestic USA sales. 
Reflecting the importance attached to international sales and revenues a 
number of the software publishers undertook the strategic decision to set 
up a 'manufacturing' base outside of the USA, which would be dedicated 
to supporting these international markets. The attractiveness of Ireland 
as a 'manufacturing' site for these software publishers is reflected by the 
fact that the IDA succeeded in attracting many of the top ranked PC 
software publishers to Ireland, including the top two publishers ; 
Microsoft and Lotus (Table 4.3).
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Table 4.2 Source; Softletter April 1992





% of revenue from 
International sales
Microsoft 1 $2275 56
Lotus 2 $ 8 2 8 51
Borland 5 $ 4 9 9 50
Symantec 8 $ 188 39
Quarterdeck 18 $ 4 9 16
Wordstar 25 $ 3 8 61
Claris na na na
Table 4.3 Source; Softletter April 1992
The software development and 'manufacturing' process can be divided 
into two distinct halves. The first is the actual development of the 
software and the relevant documentation and the subsequent translation
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of these into foreign languages. The second is that of mass producing the 
software packages and the distribution of these to the various markets 
throughout the world. The core business of the software publishers is 
software development and the marketing of this software hence their 
actual 'manufacturing' process is not viewed as a core business activity 
but as a 'necessary ev il'. In the United States, up to very recently, many 
of the major software publishers contracted out their 'manufacturing' 
operations to third parties that specialise in such activities, such as Disk 
Copy Labs and even today some software publishers still subcontract out 
this work (eg) Symantec and Borland. In Europe, the approach has been 
very similar with subcontractors such as MacByte, Softrans and Iona 
Software taking on the added responsibility of translating the software 
and manuals into local languages and producing and distributing the 
finished packages. Apart from those publishers that have set up in 
Ireland many smaller software publishers both in the US and Europe still 
adopt this approach of concentrating on their core business of software 
development and outsourcing all other activities.
The research and development activities (of developing and upgrading the 
software) are exclusively carried out in the US due to the enormous 
research and development costs involved (Microsoft is currently investing 
us$lm a day in research, development and design activities) and the 
availability of the necessary skills, mainly software developers. The 
translation of the English language software and manuals into the 
European languages is controlled by the Irish subsidiary. The end result 
of the software development cycle (including translation), irrespective of 
where it occurs, is a set of software master diskettes for each product and 
a set of printing films for each manual in that package. These are then 
passed on to the 'manufacturing' arm of the publishers.
The 'manufacturing' operation consists of duplicating the set of software 
master diskettes onto blank diskettes on a mass scale to produce 
individual sets of diskettes. These diskettes are then combined with a set
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of manuals, produced from the set of printing films by a print supplier, 
and any other documentation that may be required, such as a licence 
agreement and a customer registration card and are placed into a retail 
box to become a software package. It is a misnomer to describe the 
production activity of the publishers as 'manufacturing' process; they are 
not involved in converting raw materials from one form to another, their 
process is an assembly activity where they assembly together all the 
various components to produce a package. Only the disk duplication 
process can be regarded as 'manufacturing' process and to avail of the 
IDA's grant aided package the publishers must at a minimum perform 
this activity in their facility.
The arrival of the software publishers to Ireland and the growth in their 
business was a timely and much needed boost for the domestic printing 
industry. The revenues generated by these publishers resulted in a huge 
absolute and increasing demand for software manuals. Software 
manuals are the printed manuals that are included in every software 
package. These manuals exist in many sizes (height and length), styles 
(perfect bound, wire-o bound or saddle stitched) and they may be printed 
in many colours on the text and cover. The size, style and colours will be 
consistent for all manuals produced for individual software publishers in 
keeping within their corporate image and their desire for product 
standardisation. By having a corporate image / standard the software 
publishers are assured that all of their software products and component 
pieces will look identical irrespective of the product, language or country 
of sale. Across the range of software publishers their manuals are 
broadly similar, in size, layout, colour and finish giving rise to the idea of 
a standard software manual within the industry.
The purpose of the software manual is twofold. Firstly to act as an 
instructional guide for the user, to educate and assist the user in 
obtaining the maximum benefit from the software and, secondly to act as 
a reference for all future queries and questions relating to the software.
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Generically these purpose can be classified as the storage of information 
on paper. Returning to Lancaster's (1966) definition of a product as being 
a bundle of desired characteristics, the characteristic required of the 
manual is that it must contain the necessary information in a medium 
that is accessible and usable by the customer. However this requirement 
is a product requirement rather than a specific manual requirement; it is 
necessary for the software package to have this characteristic and to date 
it possess this characteristic in the medium of the software manual.
The production of software manuals is not an activity that the software 
publishers perform themselves, rather they subcontract it out to the print 












The compound growth rate for this printing sector is 30% (1987 to 1992) 
(Table 4.5) and the actual value of the market has increased from £4m to 
£58m, making it one of the largest sectors within the overall printing 
classification (NACE 472/473).
As a dependent sector the demand for software manuals is influenced by 
development and activities within the software publishing sector 
particularly the concentration level. Table 4.6 illustrates the breakdown 
of the demand for manuals by software publishers.
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Market Value of the Software Manual Printing Sector
Year 1984 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
V alue£m  4,0 12-0 22 '8 36,0 45‘5 53,0 58’°  63 '5*
*1993 is a projected figures
Table 4.4 Source; Internal
The most striking feature of the demand side is the dominance of 
Microsoft and this dominance is not surprising since it has a similar 
domination in the software publishing market. The one firm 
concentration ratio is 41%, while the two firm ratio is 68 %, thus 68% of 
the industry's output is accounted for by two firms, leaving the remainder 
(32%) for all the other publishers.
Breakdown of Demand for Manuals by Software Publishers
£ million 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Microsoft 8.0 12.5 16.0 19.5 23.0 27.0 30.0
Lotus 3.5 7.5 8.5 12.0 14.0 15.0 16.0
Borland 0 2.0 8.0 8.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Claris 0 0 2.0 3.0 3.5 3.5 4.0
Symantec 0 0 0 1.0 3.0 3.5 4.0
Quarterdeck 0 0 .5 .75 1.0 1.0 1.0
Wordstar 0 .8 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.5
Total 12.0 22.8 36 45.5 53.0 58.0 63.5
All figure are in £M
Table 4.5 Source Internal
Together the buyer and seller groups form a distinct cluster. The buyer 
group has restricted its manual printing business to those suppliers listed 
in figure 4.4, and these suppliers have almost exclusively dedicated 
themselves to supplying the software publishers. At the fundamental
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level the linkage between the two groups is purely a commercial one, 
payment in return for the use of machine time and expertise. However 
the exclusivity between these two groups results in this cluster being of 
strategic significance to the two parties and the current value of business 
in this cluster results in it being of significance for the entire printing 
industry. Up to know the existence of this has been a positive benefit to 
the sellers (individually and collectively), and to the printing industry as 
a whole, however the dependency that now exists on one small group of 
customers could transform these benefits into negatives if the demand for 
software manuals was to reduce significantly.
4.2 Market Structure
The software manual sector will be examined based on the framework 
outlined in chapter 2.






The outcome in 
the m arketplace  









While in virtually all markets it  is very difficult to draw a line around a
group of products and refer to them as a market, in the software manual
printing sector it is relatively easy, as all of the major suppliers have
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defined themselves as software manual suppliers or suppliers to the 
software industry. In addition to defining their mission statement these 
suppliers have dedicated themselves almost exclusively to supplying 
software manuals and have dedicated their production process and 
organisation structure to suit. Table 4.7 illustrates the proportion of each, 
firm's sales revenue accounted for by software manuals.
Percentage of Total Sales 
Revenue from Software 
Manual Sales










Table 4.6 Source; Internal
This software manual printing sector differs fundamentally from other 
printing sectors having its unique and distinguishing characteristics, the 
main ones being;
(a) Nature o f the print work and production process
(b) Software manuals as an input to another industry
(c) The role o f quality
(d) Firm size
(e) Non traded sector
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(a) Nature of the print work and production process
The primary objective of all print suppliers is to maximise the output and 
revenue from each of their machine hours. Manuals produced for one 
individual software publishers will be identical in appearances and size, 
in keeping with that publisher's corporate image and its desire for 
product standardisation, and across all of the publishers the manuals are 
virtually identical in size, finish and number of colours. This predictable 
consistency of work is in direct contrast to the commercial or general 
printing sector where the work varies considerably from job to job. This 
consistency has allowed the software manual print suppliers to maximise 
the number of saleable machine hours by minimising machine downtime; 
the more similar the work the less need there is to reconfigure a machine 
to cope with a new page size or extra colours hence the more time that is 
available for productive purposes.
The printing industry (with the exception of newspaper printing) is 
generally regarded as a 'jobbing industry' that is the 'making of goods to 
specific customer requirements and each item is usually produced as a 
'once off ' which may never be repeated' (McCarthy, 1979, p. 293). 
However, the production of software manuals is a 'batch production' 
process, with the main characteristic being the highly repetitive nature of 
the work. This transformation, from once-off to batch production, has 
involved changes in organisational structures and the introduction of new 
departments such as production control, quality control, scheduling, order 
entry and costing departments, dedicated to serving the manufacturing 
process. While many of these departments/functions are present in 
manufacturing plants in other industry's, they were, up to very recently, 
largely absent in the printing industry. The introduction of these new 
function areas has forced these print suppliers into acquiring new skill 
sets and competences.
The repetitive nature of the work in this sector originates from the
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software publisher's 'manufacturing' process. This process is a mixed 
model batch production process; they produce batches of different 
software products during each daily production cycle. The software 
'manufacturing' process does not incur significant set up costs hence there 
is no minimum economic production quantity and there is no cost penalty 
in producing small batches on a frequent basis. The procurement policies 
of the software publishers are derived from these production policies, and 
they centre on printing batches of manuals to match their production 
demands, subject to any economic order quantity. Such policies 
emphasise the need to print small batches of manuals on a regular basis. 
By purchasing in small lot sizes the software publishers also benefit from 
a reduction in their scrap costs, should the manuals be superseded by a 
newer version or should the content of the manual have to change due to 
a change in the software.
The economic order quantity for the manuals is driven by the high set up 
costs and set up time for each piece of print equipment, and currently 
there are two factors influencing these times and costs. Firstly, the 
actual design of the machinery does not lend itself zero set up time or 
rapid change over between print jobs. The machinery was designed for 
sectors where the running time would far exceed the change over time 
and consequently the actual set up time would not be viewed as a 
problem. If the modus operandi of the software publishers was similar to 
other print publishers, printing large volumes infrequently, then the 
actual set up time would not be a significant issue or a constraining 
factor. The second factor influencing current set up times and costs is 
that the actual machine set up practices are controlled by the trade 
unions via their demarcation lines, manning levels and work practices. 
Rather than seek to overcome the design limitations of the machinery 
these practices actually contribute significantly to the problem.
A contributory factor to the repetitive nature of the printing process is 
that when a print supplier is awarded a particular set of printing films
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that set remains with that supplier for the life of that product. The cost of 
switching the film (from one supplier to another) and incurring extra 
origination (platemaking) charges is an obstacle prohibiting the switching 
of products between suppliers. However the major factor limiting the 
switching of print jobs is the risks that a new supplier will not perform to 
the same standard as the displaced supplier. As a result of this loyalty 
when a reprint of a manual is required it will usually be the same 
supplier that reprints it.
This approach of printing small batches regularly and using the same 
suppliers is at variance with the way most print publishers operate; they 
print sufficiently large quantities so that the title may never have to be 
reprinted and if the title needs to be reprinted they seek quotations on it. 
This method of operation results in the software publishers placing repeat 
orders worth £5.0m per month which represents 90% of the business in 
this sector. This turnover is guaranteed to the suppliers by virtue of the 
fact that they have the particular set of printing films. The remainder of 
the business in this sector is derived from new products which the 
software publishers are constantly releasing. This new business is 
automatically divided amongst the publishers' existing suppliers because 
of their proven track record and the publishers' preference to increase 
their trading relationship with these existing, tried and trusted suppliers 
rather than commence trading with new suppliers. By virtue of being a 
proven supplier to a publisher the supplier automatically benefits from 
both repeat work and new business.
In the commercial and book printing sectors the printing job usually 
consists of one title only; however because a software package may 
contain more than one manual the print supplier is required to print, 
assemble and deliver all of the manuals in that package. Transactions 
between the software publishers and their print suppliers are done in 
units of these manual sets (through a unique part number). The existence 
of these sets places increased workload and management requirements on
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the manual suppliers because they have to print and finish all of the 
manuals in a set before they can deliver any manuals to their customers; 
one manual on its own from the set is of no use to the software publishers.
(b) Software manuals as an input to another industry
The output of the software manual printing sector is an input into the 
software production process. This is one of the few instances where the 
output of any printing sector is the input into another sector, generally its 
output is the finished article itself and is resold without any further 
processing e.g. newspapers and book printing. As an input into the 
software 'manufacturing' process these print suppliers have to contend 
with specific demands from their customers which originate from this 
process. While the individual publishers have their own unique 
requirements, across the industry there are two generic requirements 
that deserve special attention; guaranteed 'on time' delivery of the 
manuals and the provision of additional value added services.
The software publishers can only operate a successful 'manufacturing' 
operation if  their raw materials are delivered on time every time. Because 
the manuals are an integral part of their process the print suppliers are 
expected to consistently deliver them 'on time'. While the definition of 'on 
time' varies from publishers to publishers the basic concept does not, the 
delivery should be made when it is requested, not before and not later. 
Some publishers may request delivery on a specific day others have 
further refined it by requesting delivery at a particular time of that day 
(especially if  they are a Ju st In Time (JIT) company). Failure to deliver 
all of the required delivery on the appointed day or time means a late 
delivery and a possible disruption to the publisher's production schedule. 
Late deliveries may result in some form of punitive action by the 
publisher. The requirement for 'on time' delivery is next only to the 
quality requirement as a key factor for success (survival) in this sector. 
Allied Irish Securities (1989) in their report on the industry concluded
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that the concept of 'on time' delivery is a major difficulty facing the 
industry especially given the tight deadlines set by the publishers and the 
industry's historical reputation. The Rostrum report (1984 p. 47) agreed 
that the print industry had a poor reputation for meeting committed 
delivery dates. The demand for on time delivery is compounded by the 
volumes of repeat work, the vast number of titles being processed and the 
short leadtimes (time taken from the date the order is placed to its 
delivery).
In the commercial book printing environment the suppliers know well in 
advance of a print job being required, leadtimes are quoted in weeks and 
seldom are jobs rescheduled. However in the software manual sector 
leadtimes are quoted in days and rescheduling of titles is common place 
as the software publishers frequently reschedule their production to 
accommodate a new urgent order. Ironically the more successful a 
supplier is the more of a difficulty 'on time’ delivery poses; the fewer 
titles that an individual suppliers has the greater the chance that they 
can deliver them 'on time'. The attainment of 'on time' delivery has not 
been achieved without great expense particularly in the areas of 
production control systems and the managerial skills required, neither of 
which previously existed in the industry in any great abundance. As more 
of the software publishers move along the JIT  road the deadlines will 
become more rigid which in turn will impact the suppliers more severely.
As suppliers to another industry the software manuals suppliers have to 
adhere to all the requirements of their customers. In the software 
manual sector these requirements are many and while they vary from 
publisher to publisher they are a number of generic requirements that 
apply across all software publishers. Two requirements deserve special 
attention. Firstly, the holding of printed manuals in inventory on behalf 
of their customers, without charging the software publishers for the 
storage or handling of same is the primary requirement in this sector.
The need to hold finished goods in inventory stems from the existence of
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economic order print quantities. These order quantities 'force' the 
software publishers to purchase larger quantities of manuals than they 
actually require for their immediate production cycle. The balance 
(between the required quantity and the purchase quantity) must be 
stored by the print supplier until it is required. The amount of finished 
goods inventory that a supplier would be holding at any one time is a 
function of the value of business transacted between the supplier and the 
software publisher; the more successful a supplier is the more inventory 
they will have to hold unless they have reduced their set up times below 
the industry norm thereby enabling them to print the exact quantity 
required by the publisher. This requirement is in sharp contrast to all 
other printing sectors where the product is printed, delivered and 
invoiced as one batch. The second significant requirement is the 
assembling of the individual manuals that belong to a particular software 
package into a single kit so that the publisher receives a kit or set of 
manuals rather than the individual manuals separately. This kitting 
operation is very labour intensive and costly, and for most suppliers this 
activity is the limiting factor on their capacity. To cope with this 
requirement and to minimise the constraint on their capacity, many of 
the suppliers have invested heavily in both labour and capital equipment. 
Similar to the holding of inventory the cost of assembling the manuals 
into kits is not passed onto the software publishers but must be borne by 
the print suppliers.
These extra requirements are new to the printing industry and are 
unique to this sector. The extra services were not sought after by any of 
the suppliers but were forced upon them by their software publishing 
customers as they engaged in 'systemic rationalisation' (Semlinger, 1991), 
delegating all of their non-essential and non-value added activities to 
their suppliers while they concentrated on their core business of software 
duplication. By divesting themselves of these activities, and not incurring 
any incremental charge for their provision by the suppliers, the 
publishers have benefited in cost terms and in the simplification of their
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'manufacturing' process. The task of forcing of these activities onto the 
print suppliers was made easier by the adoption of these activities by the 
industry pioneer (Printech) who subsequently developed them into a 
competitive advantage and eventually made these requirements industry 
standards. The adherence to and adoption of these requirements has 
required the suppliers to invest in additional manpower and equipment 
(for non-core activities) and to achieve a competence level in these 
activities; this has not been achieved inexpensively as they are funded 
out of profits since the software publishers will not accept any 
incremental charges. The ability of the print suppliers to perform these 
extra tasks is vital if  they wish to be viewed as a major supplier to the 
industry and as more additional requirements are being placed on the 
suppliers by the publishers they have to continually adopt and perfect 
them and accept them as a cost of trading with the software publishers.
(c) The role of Quality
In the framework outlined in chapter 2, the role of quality was discussed 
as a dimension of a generic strategy. However, in the software manual 
printing sector the role of quality is twofold. Firstly it is relevant as a 
dimension of strategy, and secondly it has a vital role in defining the 
market definition of this sector thereby differentiating this sector from 
other printing sectors. In this section quality is discussed as a means of 
defining market structure.
Notwithstanding that quality is of great importance in all industries and 
that over the latter part of the 1980s the term 'quality' has become a 
management buzz word, the quality requirements of the software manual 
printing industry deserves special attention .
The software manuals are an integral part of the software package; they 
are expected to be technically correct and free from any defect. The 
software publishers require their product to be viewed by their customers
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as being of top quality and defect free like the software provided. The 
emphasis they place on a quality product can never be overstated and the 
standards set by them are very rigorous and exacting and are well above 
any standards encountered by the printing industry heretofore.
The definition, by the software publishers, of a quality product, is an 
absolute definition; either the manual is defect free or it is not. This 
approach does not accept the 'normal' printing defects such as smudges, 
spots, blank pages or missing pages, which were (are) an integral part of 
other printing sectors. The printing process is not an exact or precise 
process; it centres around a chemical reaction between ink and water and 
involves many variables which by their nature may be different from day 
to day. These variables include the paper, the ink, the hardness 
(softness) Of the water and the quality of the printing plate, and a slight 
change in any one of these may cause a 'normal' printing defect. 
Compounding these variables is the vast volume of paper printed daily by 
each printing supplier. An average printing press is capable of outputting
200,000 printed sheets per day and each sheet may contain up to 15 
pages of a manual. The quality standards that were in existence prior to 
the arrival of the software publishers (and are currently in existence in 
other printing sectors) took into account the volume of print produced and 
the variable nature of the process, and any defects were viewed as a 
percentage of the total volume printed. Providing the total number of 
rejects did not exceed the maximum percentage permissible the job was 
deemed good and was accepted. The arrival of the software publishers in 
this sector, changed this relative requirement to an absolute demand and 
it is testimony to the power of the software publishers that they were able 
to change these quality standards so dramatically in a very short time 
period.
Across the range of software publishers the quality standards are 
virtually identical and not only are these standard very rigid and 
thorough, they are 'policed' by the professional quality assurance
departments in each publishers. This is a unique feature of this sector as 
very few print publishers have such departments or have any means of 
creating and enforcing quality standards.
The 'policing' of the quality standards involves two dimensions. Firstly, 
the software publishers will not award their business to just any print 
supplier. Before a business relationship is started they will audit the 
potential supplier to evaluate their quality system and their attitude to 
quality. The basis for this audit is that without an effective system the 
supplier will be unable to produce manuals to the necessary standards, 
hence it is pointless commencing a trading relationship with them. The 
presence of an acceptable quality management system offers the software 
publishers the assurance that the printing company takes the concept of 
quality very seriously, and that providing all of their procedures and 
systems are adhered to a quality product should be produced. While the 
possession of an independently recognised Quality Management award 
(such as the Q mark or ISO 9000 registration) is not a prerequisite to 
trading with a software publisher nor does it  exempt them from being 
audited, it  is no coincidence that all of the software manual print 
suppliers have at least one of the independently recognised Quality 
Management awards, while the majority of them have the two 
independent awards. The pressure to receive quality certification arose 
not from the print suppliers overwhelming affinity with the quality 
concept but because the possession of such an award was used by the 
pioneer (Printech) in this sector as a competitive advantage, thus market 
forces forced the other suppliers to attain the same standard. Quality 
auditing by the software publisher is not a once off activity; once a 
supplier has been certified and a business relationship commences they 
will still be audited on a regular and random basis.
The second dimension of 'policing' the quality standards is by inspecting 
the supplier’s deliveries. Once the audit has been passed the challenge 
facing the print supplier is to prove that their quality system is effective
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and that they can produce the manuals to the standard required. The 
ultimate aim of all suppliers is to be awarded 'ship to stock' status by 
their software publishing customers. Ship to stock status is granted when 
the publisher has sufficient confidence in the supplier's systems and in 
their proven record to produce a quality product which they will only 
inspect their manual on a very random basis, and as such all deliveries 
can go straight to the publisher's stockroom or to their production line. 
Ship to stock status is not easy to obtain but is easy to lose, and every 
time the print supplier makes a delivery they are placing their reputation 
and status 'on the line'. I f  the quality of the product deteriorates on an 
ongoing basis then the award will be revoked. Having suppliers that are 
ship to stock is very important to the software publishers as it eliminates 
the requirement and cost of having to inspect all incoming deliveries. The 
software publishers view incoming quality inspection as a non-value 
added activity and as an activity which correctly belongs with their 
suppliers since they Eire contracted to produce a quality product.
The consequences of not attaining ship to stock status or of losing this 
status are enormous; without ship to stock status they will not become a 
major supplier to any member of the buyer group. Such is the criticality of 
ship to stock status that all of the print suppliers have invested heavily in 
their Quality Control / Assurance Department. This investment includes 
establishing and maintaining a quality management system, recruiting 
the necessary personnel to eliminate the defective product before it 
reaches the publishers, investing in additional machinery that will 
improve the actual production process thereby reducing the frequency of 
these defects and retraining staff to make them more aware of the 
importance of producing a quality product. This magnitude of investment 
in a non-core activity is new to the individual print suppliers and is also 
new to the printing industry as a whole and the current quality status 
has not been attained without considerable expense.
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(d) Firm size
The printing industry overall is characterised by a multiplicity of small 
establishments however the software manual printing sector has 
attracted to it many of the larger printing establishments (Table 4.7).
The suppliers in this sector are viewed as being among the larger (in size 
and turnover) and more profitable print suppliers in the printing industry 
and the presence of so many of the larger establishments has as much to 
do with the requirements of the software publishers as the attractiveness 
of this sector.
A firm's choice of suppliers is an important strategic decision, firms 
should strive to deal with suppliers that will positively influence their 
business and who possess the least power to influence them negatively. It 
is the function of the professional purchasing departments in the software 
publishers to select and manage the vendors that have a positive 
influence on the publisher. The characteristics of the business 
relationships that exists between publisher and supplier are 
intercompany co-operation and the concentration of the publisher’s 
demand within specific relationships.
The volume of the demand for manuals generated by the individual 
publishers and the frequency with which they reprint restricts the 
publisher's choice of supplier to those larger print firms who can absorb 
this demand as a percentage of their turnover without running into 
operational difficulties. The publishers' decision to concentrate their 
requirements with the least number of suppliers further intensifies the 
need for the supplier to be able to cope with a significant, and growing, 
demand for manuals.
The number and type of demands made of the suppliers and the high 
standards expected also limits their options to those suppliers who have 
the financial resources, human resources and capabilities of attaining
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these standards.
Suppliers' Size by Sales Revenue and 
Employees













Table 4.7 * = estimate
Source; Business & Finance Ja n  30th 1992
(e) Non traded sector
The existence of the unique requirements (especially JIT  deliveries and 
the quality requirements) has transformed the software manual printing 
sector into a non-traded sector; a sector that is characterised by a low 
level of imports / exports and where the price of the commodity is 
determined within that sector's market domestically. These requirements 
have ensured that foreign competitors cannot compete on the same 
footing as their indigenous counterparts. This status is contrary to that 
which prevails in the general book printing market where import 
penetration is on the increase.
The absence of foreign competition is a new feature for this sector. In the 
early days of the sector (1987-1989) a number of Europe's larger print 
suppliers (Wm. Collins (Scotland) and Brephols (Belgium)) were major 
suppliers to a number of publishers. It is testimony to the importance
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and significance attached to the non-price criteria by the software 
publishers that they have excluded all foreign competition even though 
they are more cost competitive than the indigenous print suppliers.
4.2.2 Market Concentration
Market concentration refers to the degree to which production or market 
share for or within an industry is concentrated in the hands of a few large 
firms. The breakdown of the market share by the major suppliers is 
illustrated in Table 4.8.
The distinguishing feature of the supply side is that it is composed of 
many equally balanced suppliers as illustrated by Table 4.9, which shows 
the industry's concentration ratios (based on market share). As 
concentration ratios are only statistical artifacts it is more important to 
review the reasons behind them rather than the ratios themselves. In the 
software manual sector the concentration level is attributable to two 
factors; first movers advantage and the customer base.
(i) First mover advantage
When the first software publishers set up in Ireland in the late 1980s few 
individuals (including the IDA) foresaw that they would exert a 
significant demand for print. Fewer still foresaw the linkages that could 
be forged with these publishers but an exception to this was Printech PLC 
(formerly Confidential Report Printers (CRP)), who saw that the 
requirements of these publishers would be different to the demands of 
any other sector, and that this sector would grow at a spectacular rate. 
Printech was established specifically to cater for this sector and it is the 
only printing company serving this sector that did not have to sever its 
links with the commercial sector in order to concentrate on this sector.
By virtue of being first into the market Printech was able to establish
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strong footholds in all of the major publishers providing it with a broad 
and growing customer base. Such a base allowed Printech's sales revenue 
to increase from £2.8m in 1985 to £23m in 1992 (a compound annual 
growth rate of 30%) and this growth allowed them to opt for a flotation on 
the Unlisted Securities Market (USM) in 1987. At the zenith of their 
growth their share price reached 170p (issued at 66p) which gave the 
company a market capitalisation in excess of £40m.
As pioneers in this sector Printech were able to establish the competitive 
ground rules for the sector. They were the first printing company to 
attain both the ISO 9000 and the Q mark standard (they were one of the 
first indigenous firms in any industrial sector to attain the ISO) and by 
attaining such standards they effectively made these awards 
prerequisites to competing in this sector. Printech was also the industry . 
leader in the areas of ship-to-stock awards, innovative pricing systems 
(using standard price tables or matrices rather than individual job 
quotations), customer service standards and in the standards of 
professionalism and image. Printech presented themselves as an 
innovative professional blue chip organisation which inspired confidence 
in the US publishers who were accustomed to dealing with such 
organisations and they became the role model for all other suppliers to 
emulate and ultimately better. Printech served as the benchmark against 
which all other printing suppliers were compared.
Printech were to the forefront of technology, being the first printing 
company (outside of newspapers and magazine printing) to purchase an 
offset web printing press (capable of producing runs in excess of 10,000 
copies in a shorter time and more economically than sheetfed printing). 
The use of web technology was a radical departure for the suppliers in 
this sector but three years after Printech commissioned their web press 
two other print suppliers (Smurfit Print and Microprint) installed them 
with a further two (Mt. Salus and Colorman) due for installation by mid 
1993. Printech were also the pioneers in the film-producing technology
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Table 4.8 Source; Internal
Concentration Ratios in the Software Printing Sector
Concentration , 
Ratio crl cr2 cr3 cr4 cr5 cr6 cr7 cr8 cr9
% 20 36 50 62 72 80 88 95 100
Table 4.9 Derived from market share
having purchased a direct-to-plate scanner which allows the contents of a 
disk to be converted to a printing plate without having to go through the 
intermediate step of being produced to printing films. Although this 
activity is not a core activity for a print supplier, Printech's venture into 
this illustrated their overwhelming desire to service their customers' 
requirements to a higher standard than their competitors.
While the advantages Printech enjoyed were not sustained and were 
eventually replicated by their competitors they did allow Printech to gain
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the dominant market share, and Printech are still a significant force in 
this sector.
(ii) Customer base
The second factor influencing the concentration levels is the publisher - 
supplier relationships, and going forward this factor will be the single 
most important factor determining the relative success of individual 
suppliers in this sector.
The customer base of a supplier has a huge impact on its level of business 
as it influences the degree to which it can utilise its machine hours. The 
concentration levels on the demand side (especially the one firm ratio) 
have a huge influence on the supply side. Those print suppliers who are 
allied with the top publishers have experienced a higher absolute demand 
and a greater growth than those suppliers who are allied with other 
publishers; this has afforded them the opportunity to utilise more fully 
their capacity and to take advantage of the subsequent product and 
related efficiencies . In particular those print suppliers who are allied 
with Microsoft have experienced, and will continue to experience, 
substantial growth and a huge absolute demand for print, far 
outstripping their competitors. Microsoft policy of dealing with the fewest 
number of print suppliers possible has resulted in its growth and demand 
being concentrated with four suppliers (Smurfit Print, Mt. Salus Press, 
Colorman and Printcraft). Together these account for 45% of the total 
market share and this share is increasing faster than any other 
publisher/supplier grouping. The existence of this situation has resulted 
in two groups operating within this market, one with Microsoft and one 
without it. The latter is deprived of Microsoft's volume, their role and 
influence as the market leader and the influence and capacity of four 
major suppliers. Assuming that Microsoft's growth continues (and there is 
no valid reason to assume otherwise) then this will have a pronounced 
effect on this market as the divisions between the two groups will become
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m ore pronounced .
The suppliers not allied with Microsoft have to be content with forging 
links with the other software publishers. This leaves five suppliers 
competing for the balance of the industry's output (55%) from six software 
publishers which are growing at a slower rate than Microsoft. Within 
these five suppliers are the two largest print suppliers, Printech and 
DDS, thus competition in this sector is more intense than in the Microsoft 
sector. Table 4.10 outlines the relationship between the suppliers and 
the software publishers which is a key factor in this sector.
Software Publisher /  Supplier Relationships
Microsoft Lotus Claris Borland Symantec WordPerfect QSS
Cahills X X X X
Colorman X
Donnelleys X X X X
Mt Salus X
Microprint X X  X
Ormond X X X
Printech X X X X
Printer aft X  X X
Smurfit Print X
Table 4.10 Source; Internal
Relative Strength of the Buyer & Seller Group
Together the buyer and seller groups form a distinct cluster1. This cluster 
is characterised by very close links between both groups and by the 
dedication of the seller's output to a very small group of customers. This 
cluster is not composed of two equal partners, rather the buyer group as a
1 For the definition and discussion of clusters, see above pp. 14-15
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whole is more powerful, dominant and influential than the seller group, 
and within specific customer-supplier relationships this domination 
varies. The actual buyer-supplier relationship that has been achieved is 
one of 'autonomy and domination', that is suppliers are formally 
independent, but are nevertheless steered by the software publishers, 
which defines the terms of trade. Autonomy in this sector also absolves 
the publishers from assuming responsibility for the outcome of the agreed 
conditions of exchange. While the relationship between the publisher and 
supplier is founded on co-operation and mutual exchange of information 
(colloquially known as 'partnerships') the distribution of the yields of 
co-operation is balanced in favour of the powerful publishers, and 
communications is simply a device to improve adaptation and compliance 
of the supplier to the customer's demand; these demands themselves are 
increasing in number and standard.
Four factors explain the dominance of the buyer group;
(1) The buyer group purchases large volumes relative to any individual 
seller's sales and it is more concentrated than the seller group. Individual 
buyers account for significant proportions of their individual supplier's 
revenues giving them increased powers and the opportunity to use such 
powers. The suppliers in this sector are either wholly dependent on 
specific publishers or on a group of publishers for their survival (table 4.6 
illustrates the percent of the supplier's sales revenues that originates in 
this sector and table 4.10 shows the specific publisher-supplier 
relationships) and as a consequence the publishers are able to exploit the 
suppliers 'passive flexibility', their pliability to the purchase power of the 
publisher. The dominance of the buyer group will be compounded as the 
capacity available will eventually exceed the demand. While it is difficult 
to assess accurately the supply side, due to the availability of extra 
capacity through overtime, shift work, weekend work and so on, there is 
evidence to suggest that the days of phenomenal growth are over and that 
at best an uneasy equilibrium exists but in the near future an oversupply
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situation will exist. Contributing factors to the excess supply are the 
demise of a number of hardware companies, such as Wang, Zenith and 
Digital, who all exercised a demand for printed manuals, and the 
introduction of extra capacity (especially web technology). The print 
sector is capacity orientated and the existence of excess capacity in this 
sector will on its own increase competition between the suppliers, and 
such a situation will ultimately benefit the publishers.
(2) The industry's product is undifferentiated, it is produced from a 
generic input (printing films) which requires no proprietary technology 
thus it can be produced by any member of the supplier group. The 
software publishers have, through their individual demands raised the 
standard within their own specific supplier group. As the individual 
suppliers attain these standards the publisher faces no switching costs in 
moving between supplier2. The easier the buyer can switch between 
suppliers the greater the power of the buyer over any individual supplier 
and the greater the credibility of threat of withdrawal of demand.
Collectively the software publishers have raised the standards within the 
entire supplier group. As these demands converge (as demonstrated by 
the similarity of the ship-to-stock programmes) and the standards of the 
individual suppliers increases, the risks associated in switching to 
suppliers outside of the publisher-supplier group will reduce thereby 
increasing the number of potential suppliers to a publisher and 
increasing the credibility of withdrawal of demand. Mutuality or 
interdependence therefore only exists to the extent that both the software 
publishers and their suppliers are dependent of the sale of the finished 
item (the software package). The publishers are only dependent on their 
suppliers to the extent that there is no better alternative; through their 
actions individually and collectively, the publishers have ensured that 
there are suitable alternatives.
2 The actual switching cost (replating cost) is not considered sufficient on its own to prevent 
the switching of printing films.
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(3) The software manual is of strategic importance to the individual 
buyers. The software manual represents a very significance cost to the 
publisher's, a cost which includes not just the printing costs but the 
technical writing costs, the platemafcing costs and any scrap or 
obsolescence costs. The manual is also of strategic importance to the 
functioning of the actual piece of software and if the manual is of poor 
print quality or is technically poor or difficult to follow this will have a 
negative impact on the image of the software publisher. Individual buyers 
have heretofore invested considerable resources on controlling this input, 
as indicated by the professional quality and purchasing departments, and 
it is certain that they will continue to invest further resources to control 
this strategic input. While at present the manual fulfils the need of the 
software publishers this may not always be the case as this need is a 
generic one; the customer needs specific information regarding the 
functioning of their product, it is not mandatory for this information to be 
on paper.
(4) The suppliers face significant exit costs if  they had to (were forced to) 
leave this sector. They have installed capital equipment which is optimal 
for the production of software manuals and ancillary services and while 
this equipment could be used to print other material it would put these 
suppliers at a disadvantage vis-a-vis other specialist printers. Specialist 
equipment procured for non print related activities, such as 
shrinkwrapping and weighing scales would not be required in other 
printing sectors and by leaving this sector that equipment would become 
obsolete. The guarantees of repeat business and of higher profitability in 
this sector are major forces that no supplier would forego lightly. In order 
to concentrate on this sector all of the suppliers have severed their ties 
with the non-software customers and they would find it very difficult to 
re-establish such ties. Paradoxically this sector is viewed as the creme de 
la creme' of printing sectors, even though the work is so basic, and by 
leaving this sector the suppliers face a major psychological and credibility 
cost. Specific suppliers (Printech, Ormond and DDS) have moved further
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along the value added chain by investing in duplication and translation 
activities. These investments have substantially increased their exit costs 
and this form of investment is only applicable to this market. The greater 
the supplier's barriers to exit, the greater its dependence of the software 
publisher.
The seller group is totally dependent on the buyer group for its future 
growth. As a consequence the existence of this cluster is potentially a 
negative benefit as it is totally dependent on the future direction of the 
software publishers. Should the software publishers change their 
direction on software manuals there is nothing in the local economy 
capable of utilising the installed capacity. To date the buyer group has 
succeeded in demanding higher standards in quality and customer 
services and, given the dominance of the seller group the indications are 
that they will start to force prices down at the expense of the industry's 
overall profitability. More importantly, individual suppliers are wholly 
dependent on their few individual customers for their future growth and 
for them the developments within their customer base will be of greater 
significance than the developments in the software market as a whole.
4.2.3 Entry Conditions
Competition in an industry goes well beyond the behaviour of existing 
competitors and must be extended to include all forms of potential 
competitors. The threat of entry into an industry is dependent on the 
barriers restricting or limiting such entry The software manual printing 
sector has been viewed by all print suppliers as a very attractive print 
sector from the point of view of growth, profitability and status. However, 
only one new supplier has successfully entered and survived in the 
market since 1988 (Microprint, an offshoot of Folens publishing) and the 
only new greenfield operation that was established to service this sector 
(Techman) has failed to make any im pact.
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The barriers influencing the operation of this market include not just 
those that deter new entrants competing in the market (market specific 
barriers) but those that insulate a specific publisher-print supplier 
relationship from competition from other members of the supplier group 
(customer specific barriers). From the individual supplier's view point the 
market specific barriers are an industry-wide concern as they affect all 
suppliers whereas the customer specific barriers are of more immediate 
concern as these relationships are critical to their individual success; 
anything that increases the contestability of these relationships is a 
potentially a very serious problem for those suppliers. The barriers to 
entry identified in the framework outlined in chapter 2 were classified as;
a Product Differentiation 
b Economies o f Scale 
c Capital Requirements 
d Absolute Cost Advantage
a Product Differentiation
The software manual is a totally undifferentiated product and one which 
requires no proprietary technology to produce; it can be produced by any 
member of the supplier group from the generic input (printing films) 
provided by the publishers thus there is no possibility of achieving true 
product differentiation. However, the suppliers in this sector have 
successfully differentiated the type of service that they provide to the 
software publishers. The service level provided ensures that all of the 
non-price requirements of their customers are fully satisfied; the 
attainment of ship-to-stock status, having a proven delivery performance 
track record and conforming to all administration requirements are the 
key elements of this service. This level of service has now reached a 
standard that many potential entrant would find difficult to attain and 
should they enter this market they would find it costly and difficult to 
replicate.
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Ironically this form of service differentiation developed not from the 
supplier's desire to insulate themselves from potential competition but 
through the actions of the software publishers. By insisting on such 
service levels the publishers have increased their switching costs/risks 
associated in switching from one supplier to another. While these 
switching costs may involve some direct financial costs (replating 
charges) these are not viewed as being of significance as the publishers 
would not have to alter their way of operating. Rather it is the switching 
risks which are of more concern to the software publishers. These are the 
risks involved if  the new supplier cannot match the performance of the 
previous supplier or attain the standards specified. The risks of a new 
supplier not delivering 'on time' or of not qualifying for ship-to-stock 
certification has been sufficient for many publishers to ignore all 
potential suppliers (especially foreign suppliers) and to concentrate their 
business with their (few) existing suppliers and to develop the autonomy 
and domination type relationship. By locking out the potential suppliers 
and not giving them an opportunity to prove their worth the software 
publishers have actually eliminated the only avenue open to potential 
suppliers of demonstrating their ability, and as a consequence those print 
suppliers not already in this sector will find this a major obstacle 
inhibiting their entry into this sector. The primacy attached to the level of 
service by the software publishers can be gauged by firstly that the 
software publishers have foregone the advantage of lower prices from 
foreign print suppliers who would be unable to provide the desired level 
of service and secondly they publishers have concentrated on perfecting 
this area in preference to tackling the area of price, at least until now.
While this barrier is a very potent market specific barrier, as the 
standards within the sector rise the risks faced by the software publishers 
in switching their business among the suppliers within the supplier 
group will decline and may ultimately reach a stage where the risk is 
minimal (and the cost negligible). As this happens the interdependence 
between the publisher and supplier will lessen and will be replaced by a
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position of dependency, the suppliers being dependent on the publisher.
b Economies of Scale
Economies of scale refer to a decline in the unit cost of a product as the 
absolute volumes per period increase. Such economies are not restricted 
to the production function, but can occur in almost every business 
functional area.
The potential entrant could not expect to receive the same level of 
business as their established counterparts but yet they are required to 
offer the same price, thus the established firms benefit considerably from 
the volume throughput which absorbs their fixed costs and allows them to 
offer a lower price. In addition, the similarity and consistency of the 
printed work augments these efficiencies and has contributed to the 
higher margins and it provides the established suppliers with a greater 
opportunity to maximise their saleable machine hours and their 
profitability.
The economies of scale barrier is both an industry specific and customer 
specific barrier. Those suppliers who are associated with specific 
publishers enjoy this advantage over all other print suppliers, as they 
have benefited from their experience of dealing with that specific 
publisher.
c Capital Requirements
The capital requirements needed to compete in this sector can be divided 
into two distinct categories; capital for plant and equipment, and capital 
for non value added activities.
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(i) C ap ita l for p la n t an d  eq u ip m en t.
The equipment required to compete in this sector is specialised and 
specific to it. Prior to the emergence of this sector the printing industry 
was characterised by firms which concentrated on specific aspects of the 
printing process; some firms specialised in printing while others 
concentrated on the downstream activities of folding and binding. To 
compete in this sector the suppliers must be capable of producing the 
entire manual within their premises (as all of the publishers are very 
reluctant to have their work subcontracted on an ongoing basis for quality 
reasons). This has forced many print suppliers to invest in additional 
capital equipment and the necessary skills to operate it. The print 
equipment installed by the suppliers is very specific to the printing of 
software manual. While other items could be printed (notably perfect 
bound books) this would require considerable modifications and even then 
the equipment would not be as efficient or as economical as other 
'specialist' equipment.
Capital equipment is also required for non-print related activities, such 
as shrinkwrapping machines, sophisticated weighing scales, kitting 
machines (for assembling the manuals into sets) and blank page detectors 
which are mandatory if  the suppliers want to ensure that a defect free 
product is produced all of the time. These capital investments could be 
considered as unrecoverable or sunk cost as they have little application in 
other print sectors hence they tie these suppliers firmly to this sector and 
increases both the entry and exit cost.
The capital requirements for print suppliers established in other printing 
sectors wishing to diversify into this sector are not as great as for a 
greenfield operation but are dependent on their existing equipment. 
However, both the greenfield operation and other established supplier 
would have to invest in the non-print related capital equipment.
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The IDA's grant aided programme for this sector has enabled many of the 
print suppliers to purchase equipment which they otherwise would have 
been unable to purchase. This allowed some suppliers to compete in this 
sector where otherwise they may have been unable to do so. The 
recipients of these grants did have an advantage over those suppliers who 
were refused capital grants, however, the IDA's policy did not include the 
cost of all capital equipment, and over the last 24 months they have 
severely restricted the grants to this sector because of the potential 
overcapacity situation.
(ii) Capital requirements for non-value added activities.
Capital is required not just for plant and machinery but also for items 
such as inventory holding, customer credit and staff overheads in indirect 
functions unique to this printing sector, such as the quality and the 
production planning functions and the maintenance of a quality system.
The largest outlay of capital is required for the holding of inventory on 
behalf of the software publisher. As the publishers adopt or further 
refine their JIT  philosophy this paradoxically requires their suppliers to 
hold higher levels of inventory, and is a direct function of the level of 
business between the print supplier and the publishers. The more 
successful a supplier is with a publisher the more inventory they will end 
up holding. In addition to funding the inventory the print supplier has 
the task of managing that inventory, not only is this an activity that they 
have no experience or particular competence in but it requires even more 
resources and money. In order to cope with this requirement many 
suppliers have had to hire commercial warehousing space or build 
additional space themselves and additional staff have had to be recruited 
to manage and control the inventory.
Capital is also required to fund all the indirect services required to 
compete successfully in this sector. Services such as quality control /
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assurance, production planning and customer services are all unique to 
this sector and all require considerable funding. These activities do not 
add any direct value but they are critical to the success in this sector.
The use of capital for these non-valued added activities reflects a 
non-productive use of that capital.
This particular barrier to entry is a market specific barrier, the 
established suppliers only have an advantage over potential entrants 
they do not have an advantage over each other.
d Absolute Cost Advantage
An absolute cost advantage is an advantage that accrues to existing 
competitors and is not replicated by potential entrants irrespective of 
their size or economies of scale.
Within the software manual sector the opportunities to create an absolute 
advantage are minimal because the influences affecting the suppliers are 
identical. They use the same machine technology (sheet fed or off set 
web) and in many cases they use exactly the same brand of machinery, 
thus no proprietary technology exists. The base raw material 
(paper) has to be imported and frequently the established suppliers would 
use the same brand of paper and ink from the same suppliers. The entire 
supplier group is based in Dublin, within close proximity to the buyer 
group; thus potential entrants not based within this region would be at a 
disadvantage.
However, three sources of possible absolute advantage do exist. Firstly, 
links with a strong and well established corporate parent is a distinct 
advantage in this sector. The presence of such a parent can offer the 
facility of low cost capital and the presence in this market may be part of 
a much larger overall corporate strategy. A corporate parent may also 
offer managerial or technical expertise and in some cases they may be
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able to offer another service (through their parent) to the publisher. 
Within this sector this advantage accrues to four suppliers (Fig 4.5).

















Secondly, while all print suppliers deal with the same trade unions, any 
productivity improvements, through changes in work practices, manning 
levels or demarcation, that an established supplier has negotiated with 
their trade union, would constitute an absolute advantage over the other 
suppliers. Such an advantage could be exploited in a number of ways 
such as low costs or by producing smaller batches of manuals more 
economically thereby following more closely the actual requirements of 
the software publishers and reducing the need to hold finished manuals 
in inventory. The likelihood of such advantages being created are remote 
given the strong unionisation of the entire print industry, but if they were 
created they would create a very significant advantage.
Thirdly, the suppliers position on the learning / quality curves gives them 
a distinct advantage. Through their cumulative experience they have 
perfected and refined their process and plant layout to yield the best 
results; such refinements are not available to a new entrant. The 
importance attached to the areas of quality and customer service 
reinforces this absolute advantage.
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By their very nature absolute cost advantages are both market specific 
and customer specific barriers to entry.
4.2.4 The Role of Price and Entry Deterrent Tactics
Established firms can prevent / restrict entry by influencing the potential 
entrants expectation about the outcome of the post entry market. In the 
framework outlined in chapter two, price limiting was outlined as an 
important entry deterrent. However, the role of price as a deterrent in the 
software manual sector should be viewed not in the context of the price 
limiting theory (or how the price is set) but as the relative importance 
attached to it by the software publishers.
Up to now the software publishers have viewed price as being but one of 
a number of competitive elements; the other elements being quality (ship- 
to-stock), on time deliveries, and the provision of customer services. The 
primacy that has been attached to the non-price elements would suggest 
that price, up to now, was not as important an element as the perfecting 
of the non-price elements. This notion is supported by the exclusion, by 
the software publishers, of foreign suppliers from the supplier group, 
despite the acknowledged fact that such suppliers are more cost 
competitive than the existing suppliers (internal source).
The relative price insensitivity of the publishers has its roots in the actual 
software publishing sector. Here, as a consequence of the phenomenal 
demand for software products (see chapter 4) the software publishers' 
priority was the satisfying of this demand. Simultaneously, the 
publishers enjoyed very healthy profit margins, and this reduced their 
price sensitivity on their raw material, which only accounted for a small 
percentage (5%) of the average selling price. The concentration by the 
publishers on perfecting the non-price criteria is a conscious act, having 
its roots in their desire to subcontract to their suppliers all activities other 
than the core 'manufacturing' activities of disk duplication and product
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assembly (a form of systemic rationalisation). However, the software 
publishers were not completely price insensitive, a degree of price 
competition existed between the established suppliers, but such 
competition was never augmented by the entry of a new supplier.
Two specific entry deterrent tactics are relevant to this market sector; the 
key role of the software publishers and the expected retaliation of the 
established players.
The primary deterrent to entry into this sector centres on the key role of 
the software publisher and whether or not the publisher is willing to 
trade with the potential entrant. The origins of this impediment lie in the 
importance of the publisher-supplier. The software publishers have an 
implicit strategy of dealing with the minimum number of print vendors 
possible and of developing strategic alliances (intense inter-company co­
operation) with their limited vendor base. To date they have developed 
their suppliers to a very high standard and these suppliers have a 
positive influence on the publisher's business. This has allowed the 
publishers to concentrate their growing demand within their supplier 
base and they now have an opportunity to further improve their overall 
position by exercising their monopoly powers. As a consequence the 
publisher's motivation to expand their supplier base (and possibly dilute 
their monopoly power / domination of individual suppliers) is very low 
thus the establishment by a new entrant of a trading relationship with a 
software publisher is likely to prove very difficult as the potential entrant 
would have to displace an established supplier. To do this they would 
need to bring something new and innovative to the publisher, and such a 
competitive advantage would have to be sufficient to justify the 
risks/costs associated in switching suppliers. The opportunities to create 
such a unique advantage are very limited in the printing sector due to the 
identical nature of the influences and processes and the high standard of 
the existing suppliers. Additionally the close relationship that has been 
built up by the print supplier and publishers makes it more difficult for
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this relationship to be severed, and as a consequence the psychological 
costs of severing such a relationship is as major obstacle in persuading 
the decision maker not to deal with the new entrant as is the potential 
risk that the new entrant will not reach the necessary standard.
Secondly the entire group of established suppliers have high strategic 
stakes in this sector. They all face significant exit costs and they are fully 
committed to this sector, effectively they are captive suppliers. Their 
commitment is illustrated by ;
* defining their mission statement as 'suppliers to the software industry'
and developing a strategy to support this objective .
* the percentage of their turnover attributable to this sector and the
severing of links with non software customers.
* the investment in capital equipment specific to this sector and in
capital equipment for non print related activities.
* the investment in indirect functions such as quality assurance , 
warehousing and customer service department and the change in 
overall organisation structure .
In addition to the above, three suppliers (Ormond, Printech and 
Donnelleys) have moved further along the valued added services route by 
offering full duplication, printing and assembly facilities to their 
customers and as such they have the capabilities to perform the same 
manufacturing functions as the software publishers. This has 
significantly increased their strategic stakes in this sector and this form 
of investment represents a major cost and a radical departure from their 
core business.
These commitments to the sector clearly demonstrate to potential 
entrants that entry to this market will be met with firm resistance by the 
incumbents. The potential entrants must make sure that they can serve 
the publishers to the standard required while simultaneously competing
80
with the established players. The print industry is capacity orientated, 
the aim of the suppliers is to maximise their machine utilisation. It 
would, therefore, be expected that the established suppliers would use 
their existing capacity and pricing as an effective means of deterring 
entry and the threat of predatory pricing is more realistic from those 
suppliers who have the backing of corporate parents. The introduction in 
late 1992 and early 1993 of additional web fed capacity serves to bolster 
the notion that established suppliers will use their capacity as an entry 
deterrent weapon.
4.3  Conduct
In the framework outlined in Chapter 2 the area of conduct was reviewed 
under three headings; generic strategies, strategy dimension and 
competitive advantage. However, the application in this chapter will be 
done by merging the three headings together since in practice they are 
very closely related to each other.
4.3.1 Generic Strategy. Dimension and Competitive Advantage
By choosing a strategy a firm is attempting to create a defensive position 
in the marketplace and it will defend this position with a sustainable 
competitive advantage over its competitors. Of the generic strategies 
outlined in the framework (Chapter 2) one strategy is common to all 
suppliers, a focused strategy. Accordingly these suppliers form a strategic 
group, a group of firms in an industry that follow essentially the same 
strategy (Porter, 1980, p. 129).
The generic focused strategy can be considered further along three lines.
(i) Focus on the core business .
(ii) Focus on a target buyer.
(iii) Focus on extra valued added services .
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(i) Focus on the Core Activity.
The suppliers who have adopted this strategy have concentrated on their 
core business activity of printing, and on meeting the requirements of the 
marketplace as a whole. These suppliers view themselves as print 
suppliers producing software manuals and similar items. The suppliers 
who have adopted this strategy are Cahill Printers and Microprint.
While these two suppliers have severed some of their links with their 
non-software customers in order to concentrate more on the software 
manual market they have not severed all of the links, preferring instead 
to maintain their ties with other blue chip customers. Microprint prints 
school books for Folens Publishing while Cahills handles virtually all of 
the Governments printing requirement, thus neither supplier 
concentrates exclusively on this sector; the software manual market 
would account for 70%-80% of their annual sales revenue.
This strategy is the most fundamental of all three focused strategies and 
it provides the basis on which to further focus. The competitive advantage 
offered by this strategy is very straightforward and is based around the 
dimension of specialisation; by specialising on their core business they 
have become top quality printing companies committed to serving all of 
their customers to a very high standard. However this competitive 
advantage is spurious as it does not really constitute an advantage over 
their competitors, who are also specialising on their core business. 
Similarly the advantage is not sustainable since their competitors have 
also adopted it.
This strategy is very cautious, it does not focus exclusively on the market 
or on a particular customer nor does it involve moving away from core 
business. By adopting this strategy they have minimum exit barriers and 
are the best positioned should the software manual market contract in 
value or volume or should the power of the publishers severely affect their
82
business. However, given that a significant percentage of their business 
is in this market any decision to exit out of it will not be an easy or 
costless one but will be less difficult than for other suppliers. Any exit 
decision will be made easier by virtue that these two suppliers have the 
backing of a corporate parent.
(ii) Focus on a Target Buyer.
Four suppliers have further focused their strategy by dedicating 
themselves exclusively or almost exclusively to supplying one major 
software publisher. This strategy appears to have evolved through the 
actions of the software publisher rather than developed through any 
conscious actions on the part of the suppliers. The suppliers pursuing 
this strategy are Smurfit Print, Mt Salus, Colorman and Printcraft and 
the strategy is focused on Microsoft.
The rationale behind this strategy is that these suppliers can focus 
clearly on serving Microsoft to an exceptionally high standard, and by 
doing so they exclusively benefit from the huge volume of work generated 
by Microsoft and from its exceptional growth rate. These suppliers have 
'strategic partnerships' with Microsoft and in return for being partners 
and benefiting in Microsoft's dominant position, they are expected to 
dedicate a substantial percentage of their capacity / turnover to Microsoft. 
This portion may exceed 80% with some of these suppliers and as 
Microsoft's print requirement grows this group of partners is expected to 
absorb this growth rather than Microsoft having to commence trading 
with another supplier. In this scenario a definitive 'autonomy and 
domination' type relationship exists with the domination almost being 
total.
This competitive advantage created by this strategy is specific to one 
customer, and is based on the dimension of specialisation; by focusing so 
narrowly the belief is that they can provide a level of service unequalled
by other suppliers. The advantage created is specific to one customer, and 
can only be considered as an advantage over those suppliers not 
supplying Microsoft. So far the advantage has been sustainable insofar as 
it has been very effective in insulating this group from competition from 
the other print suppliers. However, this owes as much to Microsoft's 
reluctance to introduce additional suppliers as it does to the existing 
suppliers' success in creating an advantage over the non-Microsoft 
suppliers. Providing Microsoft continues with its policy of only dealing 
with these four suppliers they will continue to enjoy this advantage. 
Rather than creating a defensive position against the main competitive 
force this strategy completely exposes them to the most potent competitive 
force, the software publisher.
As with all highly focused strategies this is a high risk strategy. These 
suppliers are wholly dependent on one customer for their future 
development and survival, should Microsoft change its approach to 
software manuals these suppliers will be left with a strategy and 
competitive advantage that has little significance in the overall 
marketplace. By being so focused this strategy may be viewed as a 
disadvantage by other software publishers and book publishers, who 
perceive these four suppliers to be so committed to one customer (and 
dominated by one publisher) that they (the publishers) would be unable 
to trade successfully with them. The immediate dilemma facing these 
suppliers is should they participate in the future growth of their one 
customer or should they limit their exposure and diversify either out of 
this sector or within the sector by widening their customer base.
The existence of this strategy has a huge significance for the rest of the 
marketplace and the level of competition. The exclusivity between the 
suppliers and Microsoft has deprived the rest of the marketplace of these 
players, their ideas, desire for market share and most importantly a huge 
and growing percentage (45%) of the work. From the perspective of these 
suppliers it has insulated them from competition from the other
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suppliers.
(Hi) Focus On Valued Added Services
The third dimension along which the suppliers have chosen to further 
focus is that of providing extra value added services which are or may be 
required by individual software publishers. These additional services 
centre on the provision of disk duplication, software assembly and 
translation facilities. The suppliers who have adopted this strategy are 
Donnelleys, Printech and Ormond ;
Within this strategy two sub strategies have developed;
(a) The Ormond has the facility to produce all of the publisher's print 
related requirements not just the software manuals. Through their 
associated companies they can produce the other print items that may be 
required such as the retail box and small cards. The group can also offer a 
complete disk duplication, assembly and distribution facilities.
(b) Donnelleys and Printech have further refined their strategy by 
providing, in additional to the software manual, a translation facility (for 
translation of the software and/or manuals from English into other 
languages), disk duplication, assembly and distribution facilities.
This strategy can be viewed as having two mutually exclusive elements 
and paradoxically it provides two competitive advantages. At the basic 
level this strategy incorporates Strategy 1 since the provision of the 
valued added services is not dependent on the provision of the manuals. 
Similar to Strategy 1 it is focused along the dimension of specialisation 
(on software manuals and related print items) and accordingly the 
competitive advantage achieved is spurious. The second element of this 
strategy is the provision of the valued added services (either as a stand 
alone service or combined with the production of the manuals). This
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element is focused along the dimension of vertical integration and the 
competitive advantage sought by this overall strategy is the provision of a 
complete software package (manuals, disks and distribution). This 
provides these suppliers with a distinctive competitive advantage, there is 
a clear advantage over the other suppliers, however it is not a 
sustainable advantage as the necessary equipment and skills sets are 
readily available, although they do involve considerable capital 
expenditure.
This strategy is widely focused on the software publishing industry and is 
relevant to the software publishers that have established here, to those 
that may establish in Ireland, or to those that do not want to establish a 
'manufacturing' operation base but would prefer to subcontract 
(outsource) their software production process to indigenous companies 
and have them supply their product to the European marketplace.
The suppliers who have adopted this strategy are now actually 
performing some of the same core 'manufacturing' activities as the 
established base of software publishers. Consequently the existence of 
these facilities is largely irrelevant to the buyers as they view this as 
their core activity and one that they have committed to undertaking 
themselves; these facilities may be used by the publishers but only to cope 
with short term demand fluctuations. Furthermore the use of these 
facilities by a publisher would have some implications for their taxation 
position, hence they have little or no advantage in using these facilities. If 
a wider view is taken the publishers could view the relevant suppliers as 
being in competition to them; they (the supplier of manuals to a 
publisher) are carrying out the production operation for one of that 
publisher's competitors.
Similar to Strategy 2, rather than take a defensive position this strategy 
actually exposes the three suppliers to the volatile nature of the software 
publishing industry and the changes that occur in this industry as it 
matures will have a serious consequential effect on these suppliers. Any
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move away from a core activity is a risky one as it involves dealing with 
new and unfamiliar technology and skill sets and offers services to 
customers in which the suppliers have no competence. This strategy has 
increased the exit barriers of these suppliers and they now have very 
strong strategic reasons for staying in this market. Their future concern 
is with the developments in the software publishing industry and not just 
the future of the manual.
4.3.2 Critique of the Generic Strategy
It was identified in Chapter 3, that suppliers within the overall print 
industry have specialised in particular market segments due to the 
capital requirements and the unique demands of their customers. In more 
recent times this specialisation has been encouraged with print suppliers 
being advised to identify and develop market niches (Mclver, 1977: 
FPPBI, 1992: HMSO, 1993). However the strategy adopted by the 
software manual suppliers have been to sub-focus almost exclusively on a 
sector within a market niche (the software manuals is viewed as a part of 
the wider market of book printing). Moreover the strategy has not created 
a defensive position around the dominant force, the software publishers, 
rather it has (with the partial exception of Strategy 1) further exposed the 
suppliers to this force. The competitive advantage sought by this generic 
strategy is one of differentiation based on the dimensions of specialisation 
(and quality), or integration and no individual supplier has a true and 
sustainable competitive advantage over its competitors.
The absence of a strategy based on a low cost position is both surprising 
and expected. The lack of scope that the print suppliers have to reduce 
costs, due to the similarity of cost conditions has stifled their approach to 
being cost competitive and has reduced their scope to create such an 
advantage. This also reflects a lack of innovativeness and creativity 
required to become a cost leader, especially to tackle inefficiency in the 
demarcation and manning levels. Furthermore it illustrates the
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reluctance of a supplier to take up this position as they are unsure of 
their competitors' and customers' reaction. The absence of a cost based 
strategy is also a throw back to the early days of the industry when cost 
competitiveness was not a critical factor and the importance of a 
competitive advantage was greatly reduced.
Of the five possible dimensions relevant to this market, that are 
highlighted in the framework, the dimensions of cost position and 
technical position (where in this case technical refers to process 
improvements), have not been adopted by any supplier.
The crucial question facing the entire supplier group now is not what is 
their strategy but is it capable of insulating the firm from the future 
competitive forces (the software publisher) while simultaneously creating 
a long term competitive advantage. Based on the likely future outcome of 
the industry cost competitiveness will play a key role.
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CHAPTER 5
Historically the software manual printing sector has been characterised 
by a low intensity of competition between the established players. This 
inactivity prompted a report on this sector to conclude that "margins in 
this sector are above the industry norm with average margins being twice 
that of the general printing sector" (Allied Irish Securities, 1989). A 
number of reasons exist to explain the apparent low level of competition 
in this sector.
The phenomenal growth experienced in this sector and the absolute 
demand for manuals was unprecedented in any printing sector and the 
main challenge facing the individual suppliers was the management of 
this growth which was in stark contrast to previous times when their 
problem was actually finding the work. The growth in demand for 
software manuals exceeded the available print capacity, and the 
subsequent investments in additional capacity were reactive, following 
the growth in demand (such was the shortfall in capacity that it forced 
many of the software publishers into using a number of foreign print 
suppliers). This demand coupled with the higher than normal prices that 
were being charged (due to the excess of demand over supply) and the 
similarity in the print work created healthy profit margins (approx 16%) 
which greatly reduced the need for the suppliers to compete with each 
other for the work. The higher prices were tolerated by the publishers 
because as a percentage their selling price the manual cost was very low 
(5%) and their priority was maximising their sales revenue and 
benefiting from the high margins that existed in the software publishing 
market.
The future level of competition in this sector will be more intense than in 
the past and the single dominant force will be the role of the software
Future Competitive Forces
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publisher. This role will manifest itself in three areas:
(i) Use o f monopoly power
(ii) Change in the manual specification and procurement policies
(iii) Use of alternative technology
(i) Use of monopoly power
The role of the buyer group in any market is to reduce prices and / or 
increase the level of service and quality. The dominance and strategic 
importance of individual software publishers to individual print suppliers 
has evolved as this market sector has progressed through its lifecycle.
This evolution has resulted in the software publishers now being in a 
totally dominant position as their suppliers are effectively 'captive 
suppliers', being dedicated exclusively to specific software publishers and 
to the software manual printing sector in general.
To date the software publishers, through their individual actions, have 
collectively raised the level of quality and service to a very high standard 
without incurring any incremental costs and they now have the same 
opportunity to use these powers to drive down prices while raising the 
service level even further. The extent and intensity of the pressure on the 
software publishers to reduce their costs will be a direct function of events 
in their core market. As the software industry journeys through its 
lifecycle and approaches the maturity stage it is expected that the 
average unit selling price will decline as competition intensifies among 
software publishers. One of the forces influencing such price reductions 
will the the cost of hardware products, notably PCs, which are 
complementary products for software products. Over the last 12 months 
hardware prices have fallen dramatically and following on from this over 
the same period price competition among the publishers has intensified 
significantly, especially in the upgrade sector of the market..
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In recent months the share price of a number of major software 
publishers (excluding Mircosoft) has fallen dramatically reflecting the 
investment community's belief that this sector has lost much of its 
attractiveness (due to the announcement by certain publishers,
Symantec, Borland and Adobe of financial losses or lower than expected 
earnings). While this is not a perfect indicator, the decline in share prices 
does reflect a maturing of the industry, the heightening of competition 
and once again it illustrates the strength of Microsoft (Table 5.1). As the 
average unit selling price declines it will force the software publishers to 
review (and reduce) all of their costs so that they can maintain their 
profitability thus as a percentage of the selling price the manual content 
will increase. In absolute terms the software manual is the major cost 
item (including the technical cost of writing the manual, the platemaking. 
and scrap charges) and with the volumes required significant increases in 
profitability can be made by controlling and reducing this cost; the 
software publishers based in Ireland could reduce their costs worldwide 
by $100m if  they reduced their manual content by 50% (based on the 
assumption that the manual content is 5% of their revenues).
Share Price of Selected Software Publishers 
(July 1992 - February 1993)
Share Price Microsoft SPCO $ Borland Abode Symantec
July $72.12 $8.75 $43.5 $46 $39.5
Aug 73.75 10.0 46.0 38.12 20.5
Sept 74.5 9.37 42.5 34.62 17.37
Oct 79.62 7.75 40.25 27.75 10.25
Nov 89.62 9.0 33.5 35.0 12.62
Dec 93.12 8.75 24 34.25 12
Jan 85.37 8.75 22.25 31.5 13.62
Feb 87.5 12.25 21.62 43.5 10.62
Table 5.1 Source; Internal
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To date the main preoccupation of the buyer group has been to exert its 
influence by raising the levels of quality and service, and to delegate non- 
essential activities to the suppliers. Their success in achieving this helps 
to explain the decline in suppliers' profitability since these activities are 
funded from profits and are not directly rechargeable to the customer. As 
the publishers delegate more of their non-essential activities, which the 
suppliers are not in a position to refuse, this will further constrain the 
sector's profitability. A gauge to the profitability in this sector can be 
obtained by reviewing the profit figures of Printech PLC (Table 5.2 ). 
While this is not entirely satisfactory and in the absence of alternative 
official data, this review can be taken as the closest approximation to the 
sector's aviarage .
Profit Figures of Printech PLC
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
% Profit 14.7 16.0 11.7* 16.9 12.6 12.6
Profit is based on profit before tax and is a percentage of annual sales 
revenue
* The 1989 figure includes an exceptional loss
Table 5.2 Source Annual Reports 1987-1992
Table 5.2 illustrates that current profit margins are running at 12.6% and 
the trend is downwards. While these margins are still healthy they are 
not spectacular having been reduced from the 16.9% level which 
encouraged diversification into this sector initially. Additionally the 1992 
results of Printech note that margins will continue to be lower due to 
increased price pressure within the sector; this reduction is attributable 
mainly to the use by the software publishers of their monopoly powers to 
reduce their prices and raise the overall level (and type) of service.
The expected future state of the software manual printing sector will be 
conducive to the further use of these power by the publishers. The market 
will have a surplus of capacity and the costs/risks of switching between 
the suppliers within the overall supplier group will be minimal. Given the
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capacity oriented nature of this sector and the need for each supplier to 
maximise the machine hours the existence of surplus capacity alone will 
increase competition among suppliers, which will ultimately benefit the 
software publishers.
(ii) Change in manual specification
A number of software publishers have instituted critical manual design 
changes in an effort to become more cost competitive. Manuals are now 
predominantly perfect bound or saddle stitch finished and the text is now 
more commonly printed in one colour as opposed to two or four colours 
while the covers are printed in two colours whereas previously they were 
in four colours. The grade of their paper has also been reduced to a level 
where it is at the rmninrmm standard sufficient for the print suppliers to 
use. These changes have had a major effect on the value of the output of 
this sector and they have altered the capital equipment requirement..
The focus of the print suppliers is with equipment utilisation. Hence their 
concern is with the volume of work to be printed (number of pages to 
print) as opposed to the actual number of manuals required. Accordingly 
any change that affects this volume will adversely affect the suppliers. 
Further design development will concentrate on reducing the overall 
extent or page count of the manuals. This will happen by the 
consolidation of multi-manual sets into a lesser number of manuals with 
a corresponding reduction in the overall page count. The latter could 
occur by simply fitting more words per page (reduced font size or style 
layout) or by consciously omitting certain (non-critical) sections of the 
manual. In addition to any design / layout changes there are 
developments in the software marketplace which are having a profound 
effect on the actual need for, and extent of, the software manuals as they 
currently exist; as the software markets matures and the users of the 
software become more sophisticated / informed the style, layout and 
design of the manual will change. These developments are;
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(a) Increased computer literacy together with the advent of more user 
friendly and graphically based Personal Computers will make 
computer software easier to use . As a consequence this will lessen 
the demand for huge volumes of print and the large number of 
manuals required to explain the workings of the packages. This 
has already begun with the development by Microsoft of their 
'Windows 3.1' program and the development by other software 
publishers of software packages to work on this platform .
(b) The growing development of computer based learning (cbl) which 
acts as an on line help and tutorial facility within the actual 
software programme, thereby allowing the user to learn as they 
use the software. All of the software producers are developing 
extensive 'help' files which should cater for the majority of the 
problems likely to be encountered by the users. These files are 
designed to be very user friendly. The developments in the disk 
drive and media industry (especially CD ROM) are advancing this 
development and as PCs become faster and have more memory this 
threat will become more credible. The use of the actual PC to hold 
and store the same information as the manual corresponds with 
Lancaster's definition of the product as being a bundle of 
characteristics; the qualities are still in the software product albeit 
under a different guise.
(c) The use of third party educational / training courses is providing 
all users with an opportunity to be professionally trained on 
particular software packages by 'qualified' tutors (there are no 
training programmes for these tutors). These courses are 
becoming more commonplace and they are advertised almost daily 
in the national newspapers. For corporate users of software 
packages they may be very efficient and cost effective way of 
training their staff. A more recent development is the introduction 
by specific publishers of video courses designed to educate and
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in form  th e  so ftw are u ser .
(d) The increasing use of Local Area Networks (LAN) which now 
make it possible for many users to legally use one software 
package has resulted in an increase in the number of legal 
users of a software package without a corresponding increase in 
the number of packages sold. A reduction in the number of 
packages required will lead to a corresponding reduction in the 
number of printed manuals required; LAN users will be provided 
with manuals for their communal use.
(e) A number of software producers have reduced the number and 
extent of their manuals and are instead operating a 24 hour 
toll free help lines which are manned by qualified personnel 
to resolve any difficulties the user has and which are not 
answered by the limited set of manuals which accompanies the 
package. As a complement to this the producers offer a facility 
whereby the user can send away for a comprehensive set of 
manuals at a greatly reduced cost.
The medium term view of the software manual is that it is likely to be 
composed of elements from all of the above; the introduction of manuals 
with a reduced page count, the inclusion of a limited number of manuals 
in the package, extensive help files, computer based training facilities 
and a comprehensive technical support service. Manuals as they 
currently exist will not be provided with all software packages but they 
will have to be specifically ordered by the user.
These changes will reduce the volume of print that is required. Such a 
reduction will result in a surplus of capacity and an intensification of 
competition which will negatively affect the profitability of this sector.
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(iii) Use of alternative technology
The only overriding requirement for the software manual at the moment, 
is that it be printed in a book format. There is no particular reason 
(technical or economic) restricting the production of the manuals to the 
existing technology; a very potent threat facing the suppliers is from 
alternative sources of production which match more closely the desires of 
the software publishers, small batches more frequently.
A major threat to the existing technology will come laser-style / electronic 
printing devices which employs 'state of the art' computer technology.
One such device is the Rank Xerox 'Docutech' and similar variations, 
which have refined the existing photocopying technology to allow entire 
manuals to be printed and gathered together. Currently, this technology 
is unable to match the benefits (especially quality and cost / volume 
restrictions) from the existing printing machines but it is only in the 
early stages of its development and further refinements to it  will help 
eliminate its current weaknesses. A recent improvement on the Docutech 
is the Indigo's 'E-Print 1000' (to be formally launched in September 
1993). This technology merges the performance and quality of 
conventional printing with the convenience of laser-style electronic 
printing. The major advantages of this technology are that there is 
virtually zero set up time and as a consequence there is no economic order 
quantity, and the machines can be operated by non-print-qualified 
persons thus eliminating the influence of the printing trade unions. These 
advantages make technology very attractive to the software publisher and 
hence a very real threat to the existing suppliers.
The potential of this new technology is demonstrated by the fact that two 
print suppliers (Ormond and Donnelleys) have actually invested in the 
Docutech and are currently supplying manuals from it to some of their 
software customers. Currently there are a number of print suppliers in 
the UK that do not use the conventional print technology, rather they
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have opted for this newer photocopying technology, and in Dublin one 
company currently specialises in Docutech activities for all print sectors. 
Such organisations will enjoy an absolute cost advantage over the 
conventional print suppliers who have a higher overhead or cost structure 
and are constrained by the trade unions and their practices.
A second threat to the existing supplier group will come from those 
suppliers using smaller size printing presses and ancillary equipment. 
Ironically this equipment was the forerunner to the equipment that is 
currently being used to produce software manuals. This equipment is 
ideally suited to the printing of one colour manuals in smaller batches on 
a more frequent basis and it has two major advantages over the 
contemporary technology. Firstly it is more economical to run (having a 
reduced cost per machine hour, due to reduced manning levels and a 
lower machine cost) and secondly its origination costs and set up charges 
are lower than those on the modem day sheet fed machines. Again the 
threat to the existing supplier group is from suppliers who specialise in 
this technology.
The severity of the threat from the alternative technology will be 
influenced by the speed at which the software publishers change to the 
new technology and from this viewpoint the software publishers are 
masters of their suppliers' destiny. Their impetus will come from the 
pressures within their own market to control this strategic input. The 
relevant question for the supplier group as a whole is not whether their 
existing complement of equipment is suitable and capable of handling the 
demands of the publishers but whether it will satisfy the future needs of 
their publishers customers.
The longer term threat facing the supplier group may come from the 
future shape of business within the software publishing industry. The 
core activities of the software publishers is software publishing, the
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development and marketing of software, thus their competence is in 
software writing and not technical manual writing. At present software is 
packaged and sold in its current format as there is no other viable 
alternative method for the customer to receive their software. The crucial 
questions that will seriously affect both the direction and future of the 
software manual and its 'manufacturing' process and the supplier group 
is how the. software publishers will distribute their software to their 
customers. A change to the distribution method will not alter the core 
activity of the publishers. The motivation for the software publishers to 
move to another means of getting their product to the customer is 
enormous, they could save a significant percentage of their total 
'manufacturing' and distribution costs; such costs are marginal since they 
are not associated with the software publisher's core business. As market 
leaders / pioneers in the information technology field they also have the 
capabilities to develop effective alternative distribution methods.
To illustrate how swift and fundamental a change in distribution method 
policy can be one only has to look at Dell Computers. Dell has eliminated 
the retail outlet, which previously had been the main vehicle for selling 
PC's (and a major cost), and one can now order a customised Dell PC by 
'phoning a toll free number at prices substantially lower than the mass 
produced 'standard' PC. These innovative actions by Dell have totally 
revolutionised the PC sector and this transformation could occur in the 
software sector. For example, consider the scenario whereby software can 
be ordered by 'phoning up a bureau, quoting your credit card number and 
they will download the software to your PC via a modem. Such a scenario 
is not totally unrealistic or far fetched given the quantum improvements 
made in the information technology field and such a scenario would have 
dramatic consequences for the entire supplier base and for the 
'manufacturing' operations established in Ireland.
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CHAPTER 6
Recommendations for Industrial Policy
6.1.1 Industrial policy and the non-traded sector1
In the context of a small open economy a non-traded good can be defined 
as a good the price of which is determined by the supply and demand 
within that economy. It is thus distinguished from traded goods, the price 
of which is determined exogenously to the small open economy by 
developments in the rest of the world (O'Rourke, 1990, p.408). O'Malley 
(1985, p.20) describes non-traded activities as those where there is a 
significant degree of natural protection against foreign competition in the 
domestic market due to logistic or transport costs. Some international 
trade will exist as complete natural protection is rare. Non traded 
industries are characterised by a low level of imports and exports.
A good can be non-traded for several reasons, the most obvious being high 
transport costs. If  transport costs are very high, such as in the 
transportation of cement, then it becomes cost prohibitive to export and 
import, and the price of that good will be determined within the economy. 
A second reason is logistics; commodities such as perishable items like 
milk cannot be transported over long distances, while the provision of 
services such as hairdressers, accountants and solicitors between 
countries is impractical. The third reason is government intervention. 
Governments may block the import of certain goods or severely limits 
them by imposing strict quotas and / or tariffs. Goods and services which 
are defined as non-traded will vary from country to country and within a 
country these goods and services will evolve over time. The boundaries of 
such goods are thus endogenous to the economic system and depend on 
the actions of the rational economic agents. For example if  transportation 
cost decline significantly, goods that were previously non-traded
1 The discussion in the pages that follow is drawn from O'Rourke (1990, p 408 - 417)
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may become traded providing the economic agents are willing to exploit 
such a change .
One major problem arising in the empirical work on non-traded goods is 
that while it is easy in theory to say whether a good is internationally 
traded or not, it is very difficult in practice to say whether a particular 
sector is non-traded. For example the indigenous banking sector contains 
elements that can be viewed as non-traded (branch banking) while 
certain other banking activities occur within the international financial 
community (O'Rourke, 1990, p 409). The same is true of the printing 
industry, certain aspects of this sector such as newspapers and book 
printing face foreign competition whereas other sectors like Government 
reports and simple price leaflets do not.
O'Rourke (1990) argues that the importance attached to the role of the 
non-traded sector has been undermined because of the mistaken belief 
that because the traded sector earns foreign exchange all other sectors in 
the economy depend on it and consequently that Government policy 
should focus exclusively on this sector. Non traded activities in their own 
right are important to the overall economic wellbeing, he argues, for the 
following reasons:
Firstly, in order to increase GDP attention should be paid to both the 
traded and non-traded activities. Given that technological progress is an 
important requirement for an increase in GDP, producing more goods 
and services with a given amount of resources, then technological 
progress in both sectors is equally important and such progress is not 
dependent on the traded sector. There is an implied assumption that 
because non-traded activities are sheltered from foreign competition they 
are inefficient and possess monopoly powers. Such an assumption is 
invalid and it is important to remember that non-traded activities face 
domestic competition so they are not sheltered for all forms of 
competition.
100
Secondly, a country's competitiveness depends on its non-traded sector 
(competitiveness being the rate of return which factors of production 
specific to the export sector in a given country can earn given foreign 
competition). It is the price at which the non-traded inputs are supplied 
into the traded sector that determines how they can compete against 
foreign competition.
Thirdly, if there are positive externalities to the production of a good 
(benefits arising from the production of the good which accrue to society 
at large, but not to the manufacturer of that good) closed economic theory 
suggests that there is a case for subsidising the production of that good. A 
typical externality is a 'linkage', where the output of one industry is used 
as the input to another; where this output is non-traded and used widely 
in the economy considerable benefits can be gained from increasing its 
productivity in any sense .
As a illustration of the manner in which non-traded activities have been 
discriminated against by industrial policy, O'Rourke (1990) cites the 
example of the NESC Report (1982) which recommends that non-traded 
businesses should be discriminated against by reducing the grants 
available to them and by making its harder for them to obtain grants vis- 
a-vis companies exporting .
Conniffe and Kennedy's report (1984, p.43) on unemployment added that 
"a primacy attaches to the open or competing sector in that it is the only 
sector in which expansion will tend to alleviate rather than exacerbate 
the fundamental balance of payments and fiscal constraints". In 
addition, the 1986 NESC report claimed "that those sectors of the 
economy which exclusively or predominantly serve the domestic market 
cannot be regarded as an independent source of sustained growth " (p. 
147).
The assumption that the non-traded sectors are unimportant to the
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economy and are therefore undeserving of appropriate industrial policies 
is incorrect. Industrial policy is "designed to affect the general market 
mechanisms of production and resource allocation" (Lindbeck, 1981, 
p. 391), and such mechanisms are not the sole domain of the traded 
sector.
6.1.2 Industrial Policy for the Print Sector
Similar to other non-traded sectors the print and publishing sector has 
been devoid of a coherent industrial policy. Such an absence is 
disappointing given the importance of the sector to the overall economy 
and the opportunity that exits for import substitution. For the future 
success of the print sector it is vital that such a policy be developed and 
implemented, and that it be based on correcting the structural 
deficiencies of this sector as outlined in the Mclver Report (1977) and the 
submission made by the FPPBI (1992).
The basic thrust of industrial policy to date (for all sectors) has been the 
creation of jobs. While this is a very worthwhile objective the salient point 
relating to the print industry is that it is overmanned and as a 
consequence inefficient. The aim of any future industrial policy for this 
sector should be to concentrate on improving efficiency and 
competitiveness while simultaneously constraining costs. This may in the 
short term lead to job losses but in the long run a competitive print sector 
will create additional 'true'jobs (as opposed to jobs automatically created 
due to demarcation and manning levels). While such a proposed move 
contradicts the positive externality benefit outlined earlier, it is crucial 
that the fundamental problem of overmanning be tackled.
Wage and salary costs need to be controlled as these have a major 
influence on the sector's competitiveness being the single largest expense 
items. The focus of wage constraint needs to be at the craft level, since it 
is these craftsmen that historically have commanded higher levels of pay.
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Twenty four percent of the industry's employees are craftsmen or 
apprentices. As the sector progresses down the technological road 
the industry is moving away from its craft basis.
In tandem with wage and salary costs the training of personnel also 
needs revising. The printing industry can no longer afford to be insular, it 
faces competition from other sources of text and colour reproduction and 
it must adapt its training needs to cater for the newer technologies. The 
current four year apprenticeship scheme is too archaic and is in need of 
immediate up dating to a work module basis. The technological 
improvements in the sector will radically alter its training needs.
Overall productivity needs to be improved by the elimination of restrictive 
practices and lines of demarcation. Essentially this is an activity that will 
be conducted at plant level but it requires the co-operation of the trade 
unions. Notwithstanding that this is a management task it should be a 
priority for the policy makers to develop the 'atmosphere' where such 
improvements can be made. The current practices are the most serious 
threat facing the printing industry and it is imperative that this 
deficiency be corrected. Providing the demarcation lines are removed the 
foundations should be laid to ensure that the can never recur and to this 
end a programme of cross training should be encouraged, which will 
result in the personnel being qualified to operate a range of printing, 
folding and binding equipment. This would eliminate the craft basis in 
the sector and in its place would be a print technologist type of position. 
The ground work for such fundamental changes needs to be laid as early 
as possible as this is not a project that will come to fruition in the short 
term.
The capital intensive nature of this sector and the changing face of 'print' 
technology could result in access to capital being a factor constraining the 
sector's growth. As a result access to capital should be easier. Such 
access can arise either through a better association between the industry
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and the capital markets and/or by reintroducing capital grants. Should 
the latter arise the criteria for allocating capital grants need to be clear 
and distinct and it should not be based on the number of projected new 
jobs (as is currently the case) but should be based on improved 
productivity / competitiveness or import substitution.
A policy of firm rationalisation needs to be pursued to correct the 
problems created by a multitude of small establishments. Such 
fragmentation is a constraint on the industry's overall financial 
performance. Such a policy is a major undertaking and it would require 
the assistance of a number of State agencies.
The reliance by the major printing companies on a small group of the 
software publishers is a main concern. Such a dependence exposes these 
suppliers should the publishers alter their strategy and there is nothing 
in the local economy capable of taking over the demand. Accordingly steps 
need to be taken to minimise the dependency of these suppliers on 
specific publishers. The software publishers themselves have a major role 
to play in ensuring that this dependency is reduced. The sector needs to 
establish a mechanism to monitor the future trends in the software 
manual sector. A suggestion is a working party type of arrangement of 
both the publishers and the suppliers .
*
Opportunities exist for the print suppliers to explore other technical 
manual markets, similar in their needs to the software sector. These links 
with other publishers need to be carefully explored. Further opportunities 
exist for import substitution of general reading books. The success of 
indigenous companies competing with foreign competition is directly 
related to improvements in the industry's competitiveness. Only if  such 
improvements come about can the industry look to the export markets .
It is vital that a coherent policy be developed for this sector to take into 
account the sector's uncompetitiveness, skills requirement, wage cost, and
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future technology. The sector is a net contributor to the economy and 
every effort needs to be made to ensure the long term success of the 
printing industry . By improving their competitiveness, technology and 
skills the individual print suppliers will be in a better position to face all 
forms of competition (foreign, indigenous and from new technologies) and 
collectively the industry's contribution to the economy will be improved. 
The print industry should no longer be viewed as a craft industry but as 
manufacturing industry that produces printed items.
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